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ABSTRACT
We examine the effect of stock liquidity on accruals-based earnings management.
Finance literature suggests that stock liquidity leads to price efficiency. If prices are efficient,
more future earnings should be reflected in current prices. Therefore, gain from shifting accruals
across periods should be low and managers should have less incentive to manage earnings. We
find that higher stock liquidity is associated with higher future earnings response coefficient and
lower accruals-based earnings management. Our finding has important implication for the
decline in accruals-based earnings management during 2001-2005 documented in prior study.
Our additional trend analysis suggests that instead of SOX and other concurrent events, price
efficiency improvement resulting from microstructure regime shifting (e.g., reduction in tick size
from $1/16 to $1/100) may drive the decline in accruals-based earnings management during the
period of 2001-2005.

vi

1. INTRODUCTION
In this study, we examine the effect of stock liquidity on price efficiency and accruals-based
earnings management (AEM). In the finance literature, both theories and empirical findings
suggest that stock liquidity contributes to stock price efficiency. That is, as stock liquidity
increases stock prices become more informative about firms’ economic fundamentals. In line
with the role of stock liquidity in enhancing price efficiency, we hypothesize that as stock
liquidity increases stock prices exhibit greater capability of reflecting future earnings (H1). We
argue that the price efficiency-enhancing effect of stock liquidity has important implication for
AEM. Specifically we argue that stock liquidity and ensuing price efficiency dampen certain
motives for firms and/or their managers to engage in AEM. We hypothesize that as stock
liquidity increases and thus stock prices better reflect future earnings, firms will engage in less
AEM.
We use the high-low stock liquidity measure proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012). We
choose the high-low stock liquidity measure proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) because this
high-low stock liquidity measure exhibits several desirable attributes (see Corwin and Schultz
2012). First, this high-low stock liquidity measure has strong theoretical foundation. Corwin and
Schultz (2012) developed this high-low liquidity measure on the basis of two simple
uncontroversial empirical regularities. Second, Corwin and Schultz (2012) showed that this highlow measure outperforms other popular low-frequency measures in capturing cross-sections of
both spread levels and month-to-month changes in spreads. We argue that it is a highly desirable
feature for any low-frequency liquidity measure to possess high cross-section correlations with
liquidity measures computed from high-frequency intraday transaction level data, especially
when the low-frequency liquidity measure is used in cross-section regression. Third, this high1

low stock liquidity measure is less computationally complex and demanding, compared than
other stock liquidity measures. In our main test, we adopt the modified Jones model proposed in
Dechow et al. (1995) to estimate levels of normal and discretionary accruals. Following Hribar
and Collins’s (2002) suggestion, we adopt the cash-flow approach to the calculation of total
accruals.
To test H1, we adopt the model proposed in Gelb and Zarowin (2002) as our main regression
model. Because of the panel nature of our data we use two-way clustered standard errors (i.e.
clustered on both firm and year) to calculate test statistics. We find that future earnings
coefficients increase as stock liquidity increases, suggesting that stock prices exhibit greater
capability of reflecting future earnings as stock liquidity increases. In our robustness analysis, we
use the model proposed in Lundholm and Myers (2002) and obtain essentially the same result.
To test H2, we adapt the regression model used in Cohen et al. (2008). One important
outcome of our study is the provision of a market efficiency-based explanation to the finding that
accruals-based earning management increased steadily from 1987 and started to decline after the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 documented in Cohen et al. (2008). Adoption
of the regression model used in Cohen et al. (2008) ensures that our study is directly comparable
to Cohen et al. (2008). Robustness analysis shows that our finding about the relationship between
stock liquidity and AEM may not be driven by omitted correlated variables and reversal causality.
In our additional analysis, we examine the trends of stock liquidity and discretionary accruals
during 1989 – 2010. In line with our cross-sectional finding about the dampening effect of stock
liquidity on AEM, we find that variations in the magnitude of AEM over time are closely related
to variations in the overall stock liquidity over time as implied in our H2. Our findings suggest
that besides SOX and other concurrent events price efficiency improvement resulting from
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microstructure regime shifting (e.g. reduction in tick size from $1/16 to $1/100) may drive the
decline in AEM during the period of 2002-2005 documented in Cohen et al. (2008). In other
words, our study provides a capital market efficiency-based explanation of the decline in AEM
during the period of 2002-2005 documented in Cohen et al., (2008).
Our study contributes to the literature at least in four aspects. First, our study provides direct
evidence that stock liquidity and thus price efficiency influence managers’ decisions on AEM. It
has been long theoretically acknowledged that accounting choices including AEM play no
substantive role in a complete and perfect market (see Fields et al. 2001). Our finding about the
dampening effect of stock liquidity on AEM lends empirical support to the theoretical
acknowledgement of the importance of capital market efficiency in managers’ decisions on
accounting choices, suggesting that future research on accounting choices may need to explicitly
take capital market efficiency into account in research design.
Second, our findings add to research that examines the real effects of capital market
efficiency. Existing research on the real effects of capital market efficiency has examined a
variety of issues ranging from price discovery and formation to corporate governance (see Bond
et al. Forthcoming). For instance, the work of Fama and Jensen (i.e., Fama 1980; Fama and
Jensen 1983a,b) suggests that when stock prices timely, un-biasedly reflect the impact of
managers’ decisions on net cash flows, stock markets together with product markets and
managerial labor markets can serve as a governance mechanism for disciplining managers;
Ferreira et al. (2011) find that stock price informativeness affects the structure of corporate
boards; Edmans et al. (2011) find that stock liquidity encourages the formation of blockholdings
and shapes blockholders’ governance preference. In our knowledge, our study is among the first
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empirical work that shows that stock liquidity and thus price efficiency discourage firms and
their managers from engaging in AEM.
Third, our study provides a market efficiency explanation of the decline in AEM during the
period of 2002-2005 first documented in Cohen et al. (2008). Our finding suggests that the
decline in AEM during the period of 2002-2005 may not be driven only by the passage of SOX
and other concurrent events but may also be caused by overall improved stock liquidity and thus
price efficiency. Given that one of the main purposes of SOX is to curb opportunistic earnings
management and compliance with SOX is very costly, our finding suggests that we may need to
reevaluate the impact of SOX.
Fourth, our finding that higher stock liquidity is associated with higher FERC lends macrolevel support to the positive effect of stock liquidity on price efficiency. Prior studies (e.g.
Chordia et al. 2008) infer the effect of liquidity on price efficiency from micro-level price
attributes such as short-term return predictability from order flows, proximity to random walk
benchmarks, and return autocorrelations. Compared with micro-level evidence, our macro-level
evidence is directly in line with theoretical predictions about the effect of liquidity on price
efficiency (see Holmstrom and Tirole 1993).
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we first review literature about the
effect of stock liquidity on price efficiency. Then we develop our hypotheses. In section 3, we
describe our measures of stock liquidity and discretionary accruals, the regression models used to
test our hypotheses, and estimation techniques. In section 4, we describe our data sources and
sample, and report the summary statistics of variables used to test the effect of stock liquidity on
AEM. In section 5, we report and discuss the results of our analyses including robustness,
causality, and additional analyses. Section 6 concludes.

4

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1 Stock Liquidity and Price Efficiency
Prices formed through market mechanisms aggregate information possessed by market
participants about the value of traded assets (Hayek, 1945). Specifically, in stock markets
investors with diverse pieces of information trade with each other and endeavor to profit from
their private information. Arising from trades between investors, stock prices aggregate these
different pieces of information and reflect investors’ overall expectations of the value of firms’
stocks (Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Hellwig 1980). Moreover, there exist wide variations, both
cross-sectional and inter-temporal, in the efficiency of stock prices (see Boehmer and Kelley
2009; Chordia et al. 2008). Stock price efficiency refers to the extent to which stock prices are
informative about the economic fundamentals of traded stocks (Bond et al., Forthcoming). The
microstructure of stock markets significantly influences stock price efficiency (Madhavan 2000;
O’Hara 2003). Liquidity is among the most important aspects of stock market microstructure that
have first-order effects on price efficiency (Holmstrom and Tirole 1993; O’Hara 2003). Liquidity
is embodied in investors’ capability of trading a large number of stocks quickly at low cost with
little price impact (Liu 2006).
The research in economics and finance has identified a variety of closely related channels
through which stock liquidity contributes to stock price efficiency. First, improvement in stock
liquidity increases the marginal value of information and thus motivates market participants to
acquire private information about firms’ fundamental value (Holmstrom and Tirole 1993). The
most direct effect of improvement in stock liquidity is the reduction in trading costs and hence
increases trading profits from private information. Furthermore, improvement in liquidity makes
it easier for an informed investor to disguise his private information and profit from it regardless
5

of whether his private information is strategic (i.e. intervention-related) or is simply speculative
(i.e. trading-oriented) (Holmstrom and Tirole 1993; Kyle and Vila 1991; Maug 1998). Moreover,
improvement in stock liquidity lowers the threshold for the value of information upon which
investors can profitably trade. In summary, the improvement in stock liquidity not only results in
the increase in trading profits from private information and therefore incites more market
participants to become privately informed, but also enlarges the set of information that can be
impounded into prices through trading. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show that price efficiency
increases as the number of informed investors and/or the quality of information increase. In
addition, stock liquidity facilitates trading between investors and thus accelerates the impounding
of private information into stock prices.
Second, several theoretical papers suggest that stock liquidity encourages the formation
of blockholdings (i.e., Kyle and Vila 1991; Edmans 2009; Maug 1998). During takeover bids,
blockholders that initiate takeover bids face potential free-ride on the improvement after
acquisition from existing shareholders if existing shareholders are aware that they are selling to
raiders (Grossman and Hart 1980). Kyle and Vila (1991) show that liquidity allows blockholders
to camouflage their purchases by pooling with noise traders and therefore acquire large block of
shares at favorable prices. Similarly, Maug (1998) shows that liquidity encourages investors to
intervene because a liquid stock market makes it less costly to hold large stakes and makes it
easier to purchase additional shares at prices that do not incorporate the full gains from
intervention. In a trading model, Edmans (2009) shows that blockholders optimally choose
higher initial stakes if stock liquidity is higher because higher stock liquidity offers blockholders
greater ability to sell shares upon negative information. The work of Edmans et al. (2011) and
Gerken (2011) provides empirical evidence that supports the positive relationship between stock
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liquidity and formation of blockholdings. Using a sample of U.S. external blockholdings from
1994-2005 Gerken (2011) finds that liquidity increases the likelihood of block formation;
focusing on hedge fund blockholders Edmans et al. (2011) find that hedge funds are more likely
to acquire blocks in liquid firms than in illiquid firms. 1
Blockholders generally have superior information. Because of the large amount that
blockholders can sell upon negative information, blockholders have incentives to become
informed (Edmans 2009). In other words, the utility of information is higher to blockholders
because blockholders can make greater use of it. Because quality information acquisition incurs
fixed costs such as investment in research databases, blockholders will only acquire information
on large ownership stakes (Boehmer and Kelley 2009). Moreover, blockholders have greater
access to management and/or have better abilities to acquire information and conduct quality
fundamental analysis due to economies of scale and resources at their discretion (Bhushee and
Goodman 2007).
Prior studies provide empirical evidence that confirms the information superiority of
blockholders. Blockholders are generally institutional investors. Bhushee and Goodman (2007)
find that the private information content of trades by institutional investors does increase with
institutional investors’ stakes in a firm. Event-related studies show that institutional investors sell
their stakes in advance of events associated with poor performance such as value-destructive
mergers (Chen et al. 2007) and forced CEO turnovers (Parrino et al. 2003). Campbell, et al.
(2009) use a sophisticated method to infer daily institutional trading behavior from TAQ
database of NYSE and find that institutions anticipate earnings surprises and post-earnings

1

Both Edmans et al. (2011) and Gerken (2011) adopt the instrument variable approach to ensure
the validity of their causality inferences about the positive relationship between stock liquidity
and the likelihood of block formation.
7

announcement drift. In line with Campbell et al. (2009), Ke and Petroni (2004) show that
transient institutions predict the break in a string of consecutively earnings increases at least one
quarter in advance of the break quarter; Bartov et al. (2000) document a negative relationship
between

institutional

holdings

and

post-announcement

abnormal

returns;

Ke

and

Ramalingegowda (2005) find that transient institutional investors exploit the post-earnings
announcement drift; Collins et al. (2003) show that the presence of institutional investors
mitigates the magnitude of negative returns associated with accruals. More importantly, liquidity
enables and even encourages blockholders to trade on their private information (Edmans 2009;
Edmans et al. 2011).
Third, liquidity stimulates speculation-based arbitrage. Speculation-based arbitrage
involves taking a long-position in undervalued stocks and/or a short-position in overvalued
stocks. Arbitrage traders are generally well-informed (Boehmer et al. 2008). For instance,
Karpoff and Lou (2010) find that abnormal short interest increases steadily in the nineteen
months before financial misrepresentation is publicly revealed, suggesting that short sellers can
detect firms that misrepresent their financial statements. Therefore, arbitrage trading contributes
to the convergence of prices and fundamental values and improves price efficiency (see Saffi and
Sigurdsson 2011; Hirshleifer et al. 2011). However, arbitrage trading is both costly and risky
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997; O’Hara 2003). By directly reducing trading costs and enabling
investors to change holding positions at prices that do not fully reflect their private information,
liquidity increases the profits of arbitrage trading. In practice, taking a short-position in
overvalued stocks is generally more costly than taking a long-position in undervalued stocks. By
encouraging the formation of blockholdings and thus increasing the availability of shares for
borrowing by short arbitrageurs (Nagel 2005; Hirshleifer et al. 2011), liquidity can reduce costs
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associated with short arbitrage. By facilitating trading and speeding the convergence of stock
prices and fundamental values, liquidity can reduce risks associated with arbitrage such as
liquidity risk.
Chordia et al. (2008) provide micro-level evidence that stock liquidity contributes to
stock price efficiency. Market microstructure research shows that reduction in the minimum tick
size leads to improvement in stock liquidity (Bessembinder 2003; Chordia et al. 2005). Using
intraday transaction data for stocks that were traded every day at NYSE during the period of
1993 to 2002, Chordia et al. (2008) examine whether stock price efficiency differs across three
different liquidity regimes: (i) January 4, 1993 – June 23, 1997 when the minimum tick size is
$1/8; (ii) June 24, 1997 – January 28, 2001 when the minimum tick size is $1/16; and (iii)
January 29, 2001 – December 3, 2002 when the minimum tick size is $1/100.
Finance research uses two ways for quantifying price efficiency. Consistent with the
notion of efficient markets (Fama 1970), the first way uses the lack of return predictability as the
criterion for efficiency. However, market microstructure research acknowledges that even when
markets are semi-strong prices can reflect varying degrees of private information (Kyle 1985).
Therefore, the market microstructure literature uses the amount of information reflected in prices
as the criterion for efficiency. Consistent with the first way of measuring price efficiency,
Chordia et al. (2008) use short-horizon return predictability from order flows as their measure for
price inefficiency and use variance ratio tests to examine the degree to which prices are close to
random walk benchmark. Chordia et al. (2008) find that short-horizon return predictability from
order flows was lower and prices were closer to random walk benchmarks during more liquid
regimes suggesting that liquidity stimulates arbitrage activity. In line with the microstructure
way of measuring price efficiency, Chordia et al. (2008) use open-close/close-open return
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variance ratio and return autocorrelations to measure price efficiency. Chordia et al. (2008) find
that open-close/close-open return variance ratios were higher and return autocorrelations were
smaller during more liquid regimes, suggesting that more private information is incorporated into
prices during more liquid regimes.
To sum up, stock liquidity increases the marginal value of private information and thus
motivates market participants to engage in private information production; stock liquidity
encourages the formation of blockholdings; and stock liquidity stimulates speculation-based
arbitrage. Therefore, stock liquidity enlarges the proportion of investors who are informed,
increases both the quality and quantity of information that can be incorporated into prices, and
accelerates the impounding of information into prices and thus the convergence of prices and
values. All these effects contribute to stock price efficiency (see Grossman and Stiglitz 1980).
Moreover, micro-level evidence supports the empirical validity of the positive effect of stock
liquidity on stock price efficiency.
2.2 Hypothesis Development
Stock prices reflect future earnings and thus lead current-period earnings (Kothari and
Sloan 1992). Both economic and accounting reasons underlie the empirical regularity that price
lead earnings: (i) current-period earnings have limited capability of measuring firms’
fundamental value simply because operational and strategic decisions made by managers have
both short-term and long-term impacts on firms’ profitability (Barney 1991); and (ii) earnings
lack of timeliness because of objectivity, verifiability, and conservatism conventions underling
the accounting measurement process (Collins et al. 1994).
In theory, Ohlson (1995) shows that if there were no market frictions stock prices could
be expressed as a function of current book value of equity and future earnings. In reality, stock
10

prices vary widely in their ability to accurately reflect the fundamental value of the underlying
equity. Evident in our review of the literature on how stock liquidity contributes to stock price
efficiency, as stock liquidity improves stock prices will more faithfully capture the fundamental
value of the underlying equity (also see Holmstrom and Tirole 2002). Holding everything else
(e.g. the required cost of equity capital) equal, the relationship between stock prices and future
earnings should increase with stock liquidity. Therefore, we have the following hypothesis:
H1: Ceteris paribus, the higher stock liquidity the stronger the relationship between stock prices
and future earnings.
Anecdotal cases, survey of executives, and findings of archival research suggest that
managers engage in earnings management (Dechow et al. 2011; Graham et al. 2005; Healy and
Palepu 2003). A variety of motives underlie firms’ and their managers’ earnings management
decisions such as avoidance of debt covenant violations, evasion of regulatory intervention,
manipulation of market participants’ perceptions, communication of inside information, and
maximization of management compensations (Fields et al. 2001; Healy and Wahlen 1999).
Stock liquidity and ensuing price efficiency have important implication for firms’ and their
managers’ earnings management behavior. We argue that stock liquidity and ensuing stock price
efficiency dampen some of these motives underlying firms’ and their managers’ earnings
management decisions and therefore temper firms’ and their managers’ earnings management
behavior.
Among the most often cited motives underlying managers’ earnings management
decisions is the manipulation of investors’ perceptions of firms’ economic fundamentals (Fields
et al. 2001; Healy and Wahlen 1999). Managers’ concerns with investors’ perceptions mainly
stem from several interrelated regularities. Most importantly, investors’ perceptions of firms’
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economic fundamentals shape their expectations about the magnitude, timing, and risk of firms’
future cash flows and thus affect stock prices. Stock prices determine shareholders’ wealth.
Therefore, stock price performance is a critical input to shareholders’ and directors’ decisions
regarding managers’ welfare such as promotion, compensation, and job security. Furthermore,
the value and mobility of managers’ human capital, especially those of members of top
management team, increases with the stock performance of firms for which these managers work.
In addition, managers generally hold their firms’ equity such as common and restricted stocks
and stock options as a result of equity-based compensation and/or voluntary trade of their firms’
equity. Therefore, managers’ wealth is positively linked to the stock performance of their firms.
The findings of prior studies suggest that, at least to some extent, managers succeed in
manipulating investors’ perceptions of their firms’ economic fundamentals through earnings
management. For instance, Bartov et al. (2002) found that firms that resort to earnings
management to meet or beat analysts’ earnings expectations (MBE) command a valuation
premium compared with firms that do not engage in earnings management and fail to MBE.
Findings with implications similar to Bartov et al.’s (2002) are provided in Barth et al. (1999),
Kasznik and McNichols (2002), and Skinner and Sloan (2002).
We argue that stock liquidity affects the extent to which managers succeed in
manipulating investors’ perceptions of their firms’ economic fundamentals and thus achieving
desired stock prices. Evident in our literature review, as stock liquidity improves stock prices
will more faithfully capture the fundamental value of underlying equity. In other words, as stock
liquidity improves and consequently stock prices become more informative about firms’
economic fundamentals, stock prices will become less sensitive to managers’ earnings
management because investors as a whole will possess higher ability to “see through” accounting
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choices made by managers. In the absence of stock price responses to their earnings management,
managers will have less motivation to engage in earnings management in the first place (Edmans
2009; Fields et al. 2001). Therefore, as stock liquidity improves and consequently stock prices
become more informative about the economic fundamentals of firms, managers should engage in
less earnings management.
Another channel through which stock liquidity and ensuing stock price efficiency
dampen firms’ and their managers’ incentives for earnings management arises from the effect of
stock liquidity and ensuing stock price efficiency on compensation practices and structures.
Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) theoretically demonstrated that as liquidity increases and
consequently trade prices become more informative regarding the fundamental value of
underlying assets at the equilibrium level firms should optimally increase the sensitivity of
managers’ pay to price levels. Empirical research guided by the theoretical lens of Holmstrom
and Tirole (1993) provides evidence consistent the theoretical prediction of Holmstrom and
Tirole (1993). For instance, Jayaraman and Milbourn (Forthcoming) found that CEO’s pay-forperformance sensitivity with respect to stock prices is increasing in the liquidity of the stock
(also see Fang et al. 2009; Kang and Liu 2008). Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Jiang et al.
2010), Jayaraman and Milbourn (Forthcoming) measured pay-for-performance sensitivity as the
dollar change in the value of the manager’ stock and option holdings arising from a one
percentage increase in the company’s stock price.
Furthermore, stock liquidity and ensuing stock price efficiency affects the relative
weights of accounting-based performance measures and stock returns in firms’ and their
directors’ decisions about top executives’ annual compensation. Banker and Datar (1989)
theoretically demonstrated that at the optimal level firms and their directors should assign greater
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weights to performance measures with relatively higher sensitivity-to-noise ratio in their
decisions about managers’ annual compensation. As stock liquidity increases, stock prices
become more responsive to managers’ value-creation efforts in a less biased way. Therefore, a
direct empirical implication of Banker and Datar’s (1989) work is that as stock liquidity
increases and consequently stock prices become more efficient firms and their directors should
assign greater weights to stock returns in their decisions about managers’ annual compensation.
Consistent with the theoretical prediction of Banker and Datar (1989) David et al. (2011)
documented a positive association between CEO’s and top-paid executives’ total annual
compensation and the interaction term between stock liquidity and stock returns.
In summary, as stock liquidity increases and consequently stock prices become more
efficient both managers’ “stock” of wealth and “flows” to managers’ wealth not only increase
with stock price levels but also become more sensitive to stock price levels. Both value-creation
and earnings management decisions consume managers’ cognition and attention. However,
managerial cognition and attention are strategically scarce (Ocasio 1997). Therefore, managers
have to optimally allocate their cognition and attention between value creation and earnings
management. As stock liquidity increases, stock prices become more responsive to managers’
value-creation efforts in a less biased way on the one hand, and become less responsive to
managers’ earnings management on the other hand. Therefore, we argue that as stock liquidity
increases and consequently stock prices become more efficient managers should have less
incentive to engage in earnings management, and have greater motivation to put more efforts in
value creation (also see Edmans 2009; Edmans and Manso 2011).
Stock liquidity and ensuing price efficiency also affect the demand for communication of
private information through earnings management by managers. Managers manage reported
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earnings to communicate their private information to shareholders and other market participants
possibly because institutional and legal constraints and/or lack of a credible channel prevent
managers from disclosing such private information (Demski and Sappington 1987; Schipper
1989; Tucker and Zarowin 2006). On the one hand, as stock liquidity increases, stock prices
become a good signal that summarizes the implications of managerial decisions for current and
future net cash flows more timely in a less biased manner (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983b).
On the other hand, as evident in our literature review, both theoretical work and empirical
evidence suggest that stock liquidity encourages the formation of large blockholders and
increases the proportion of shares controlled by sophisticated, large institutional investors. Large
institutional shareholders generally have greater access to management and/or have greater
incentive and better abilities to acquire information and conduct quality fundamental analysis. In
summary, as stock liquidity increases, the demand for communication of private information
through earnings management by managers should decrease.
To sum up, as stock liquidity increases and consequently stock prices become more
efficient, firms and their managers will engage in less earnings management because (i) firms
and their managers find it increasingly difficult to manipulate market participants’ perceptions of
firms’ economic fundamentals through earnings management; (ii) both managers’ “stock” of
wealth and “flow” to managers’ wealth increases with the amount of efforts that managers put in
value creation; and (iii) there is less demand for communication of managers’ private
information through earnings management.
Real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management are the two
prevalent earnings management strategies (Badertscher 2011; Cohen et al. 2008; Zang
Forthcoming). AEM involves altering accounting methods or estimates used to present a
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transaction in financial statements while real activities manipulation involves changing the
timing or structuring of an operation, investment or financing transaction (Zang Forthcoming).
Compared with real activities manipulation, AEM possesses several characteristics that make its
use more sensitive to stock price efficiency. First, AEM has no direct impact on firms’ cash
flows. Moreover, accruals reverse with respect to their impact on reported earnings. Therefore,
presuming that our first hypothesis is supported, we can see that managers will have less
incentive to engage in AEM when stock liquidity improves and consequently stock prices have
stronger relationship with future earnings. Furthermore, AEM is subject to greater scrutiny by
outsiders such as auditors and regulators than real activities manipulation (Cohen et al. 2008;
Zang Forthcoming). Accounting fraud cases against managers generally refer to managerial
misbehaviors in AEM (see Dechow et al. 2011). In addition, it is very challenging for outsiders
to distinguish real activities manipulations from real activities decisions. However, findings of
prior studies (e.g., Hirshleifer et al. 2011; Karpoff and Lou 2010) and anecdotal examples (e.g.,
Einhorn 2008; Schilit and Perler 2010) suggest that short arbitrageurs sometimes could detect
AEM. We argue that the negative impact of stock liquidity on earnings management is stronger
for AEM than for real activities manipulation. Therefore, we have the following hypothesis:
H2: Ceteris paribus, the higher stock liquidity managers engage in less accruals-based earnings
management.
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1 Proxy for AEM
Consistent with existing literature (e.g. Badertscher 2011; Cohen et al. 2008; Zang
Forthcoming), we use discretionary accruals to proxy for AEM. Discretionary accruals are the
difference between total accruals and normal accruals. We adopt the modified Jones model
proposed in Dechow et al., (1995) to estimate normal accruals. The modified Jones model is as
follows:

Where, for fiscal year t and firm i, TAC is the earnings before extraordinary items and
discontinued operations (COMPUSTAT: ibc) minus the operating cash flows from continuing
operations taken from the statement of cash flows (COMPUSTAT: oancf – COMPUSTAT:
xidoc) (see Hribar and Collins 2002); A is total assets (COMPUSTAT: at); S is net sale
(COMPUSTAT: sale); REC is the accounts receivable (COMPUSTAT: rect); PPE is the gross
value of property, plant, and equipment (COMPUSTAT: ppegt); Δ standards for change from
fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t.
For each year, we estimate the regression equation (1) for every industry classified by
two-digit SIC codes. Therefore, our estimation approach controls for industry-wide changes in
economic conditions that affect total accruals while allowing the coefficients to vary across time.
Furthermore, we require that the minimal number of observations is fifteen. Our measure of
discretionary accruals is the estimated residuals of regression equation (1).
3.2 Stock Liquidity Measure
In our main test of H2, we adopt the stock liquidity measure proposed in Corwin and
Schultz (2012). We choose the high-low stock liquidity measure proposed in Corwin and Schultz
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(2012) because this high-low stock liquidity measure exhibits several desirable attributes (see
Corwin and Schultz 2012). First, this high-low stock liquidity measure has strong theoretical
foundation. Corwin and Schultz (2012) developed this high-low liquidity measure on the basis of
two simple uncontroversial empirical regularities. Namely, daily high prices are always buyerinitiated while daily low prices are always seller-initiated. Therefore, the ratio of high-to-low
prices reflect both the fundamental volatility of the stock and the stock’s bid-ask spread. , the
component of the high-to-low price ratio attributed to fundamental volatility increase
proportionately with the trading interval while the component attributed to bid-ask spreads stay
relatively constant over a short period.
Second, Corwin and Schultz (2012) showed that this high-low measure outperforms other
popular low-frequency measures in capturing cross-sections of both spread levels and month-tomonth changes in spreads (see Table IV of Corwin and Schultz 2012). We argue that it is a
highly desirable feature for any low-frequency liquidity measure to possess high cross-section
correlations with liquidity measures computed from high-frequency intraday transaction level
data, especially when the low-frequency liquidity measure is used in cross-section reression.
Third, this high-low stock liquidity measure is less computationally complex and demanding,
compared than other stock liquidity measures. Appendix 2 provides brief technical details of
Corwin and Schultz’s (2012) high-low approach to estimating effective spread and the other two
low-frequency liquidity measures used in the robustness tests.
3.3 Regression Model for Testing H1
We follow the method proposed in Gelb and Zarowin (2002) as our main regression
model for testing H1. Gelb and Zarowin (2002) adopt this regression model from Collins et al.
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(1994). When testing H1, we refer to both the simplified and the complete versions of the
regression model. The two versions of the regression model are as follow:
∑

∑

∑

∑

∑

∑
Where, for fiscal year t and firm i,
RETi,t+j =
ΔEi,t+j =

E/Pi,t =
AGi,t =
LMVi,t =
LIQi,t =

annualized stock return that starts from the fourth month after the end of fiscal
year t+j-1, j=0, 1, 2, 3.
change in income before extraordinary items from fiscal year t+j-1 to fiscal year
t+j scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of fiscal year t+j, j=0,
1, 2, 3.
the ratio of income before extraordinary items of fiscal year t to the market value
of equity at the beginning of fiscal year t.
growth rate of total assets from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t.
the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t.
the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimate of bid-ask spread
proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) computed over a period of 252 trading
days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 1 provides the details.

Our H1 predicts that γj > 0, j=1, 2, 3. The regression model includes at most three future
years’ earnings changes because Kothari and Sloan (1992) show that the relation between prices
and future earnings is generally not statistically significant when the time lag between prices and
earnings is greater than three years. The use of actual future earnings changes introduces
measurement error because the theoretically sound regressors should be expected future earnings
changes but expected future earnings changes are practically unobservable (Collins et al. 1994).
Collins et al. (1994) suggest that inclusion of future returns can mitigate downward bias
associated with the use of actual future earnings changes because the dependent variable (RETi,t)
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are approximately unrelated with future stock returns (RETi,t+j) but future stock returns are
correlated with unexpected future earnings changes. Inclusion of the earnings-price ratio (E/Pi,t)
and the concurrent asset growth can help further mitigate the measurement error problem
because these two constructs serve as expectations for future earnings . Inclusion of firm size
(LMVEi,t) is to control for the impact of variation in firms’ overall information environment
because prior studies find that large firms tend to have richer information environment than small
firms and thus stock prices of large firms will incorporate future earnings news more timely than
those of small firms (Collins and Kothari 1989).
3.4 Regression Model for Testing H2
To test H2, we adapt the regression model used in Cohen et al. (2008). One important
implication of our finding about H2 is the provision of a market efficiency-based explanation to
the finding that AEM increased steadily from 1987 and started to decline after the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 first documented in Cohen et al. (2008). Adoption of the
regression model used in Cohen et al. (2008) ensures that our study is directly comparable to
Cohen et al. (2008). Moreover, our finding regarding H2 still holds after incorporation of a
comprehensive list of additional control variables including firm- and industry-fixed effects into
the original regression model.
Slightly different from Cohen et al. (2008), in our main test of H2 we use discretionary
accruals (DA) as the dependent variable while Cohen et al. (2008) used the absolute value of
discretionary accruals (ADA). We believe that the extent to which total accruals deviate from
expected normal accruals represents the level of AEM regardless of the direction of deviation.
The findings of prior studies suggest that firms and their managers do resort to incomeincreasing discretionary accruals to manage earnings upward for a variety of reasons such as
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meeting or beating earnings expectations (e.g. Bartov et al. 2002). Income-decreasing
discretionary accruals don’t necessarily only reflect the reversal of income-increasing
discretionary accruals occurring in prior periods. Under a variety of contexts, firms and/or their
managers also have motives to resort to income-decreasing discretionary accruals to manage
earnings downward. For instance, Perry and Williams’s (1994) finding suggests that managers
tended to reduce reported earnings prior to the public announcement of managerial buyout
proposal; the findings of a number of research papers suggest that when under regulatory
scrutiny firms and their managers tended to manage earnings downward through AEM (see
Cahan 1992; Jones 1991); the findings of a number of studies (e.g. Pourciau 1993) suggest that
incoming CEOs have incentives manage earnings downward through income-decreasing DA to
increase reported earnings in the following year and thus enhance the incoming CEOs’
reputation; the finding of Healy (1985) suggests that firms with cap on bonus awards are more
likely to report accruals that defer income when the cap is reached than firms that have
comparable performance but have no bonus cap (also see Holthausen et al. 1995). Therefore, we
use the unsigned discretionary accruals as our dependent variable.
Our H2 predicts a negative relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary
accruals when discretionary accruals are income-increasing (i.e. DA > 0), and a positive
relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals when discretionary accruals are
income-decreasing (i.e. DA < 0). To accurately represent the relationships consistent with the
prediction of H2, we include an indicator variable (DDA) that reflects the sign of discretionary
accruals (i.e. DDA = 1 if DA > 0 and DDA = 0 if DA < 0), and interaction terms between this
indicator variable and all other explanatory variables including our measure of stock liquidity in
our regression equation used in the main test of H2. In addition, the way in which we set up the
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regression model avoids imposition of the mechanical constraint that relationships between
explanatory variables and discretionary accruals are constant regardless of the nature of
discretionary accruals (i.e., income-increasing vs. income-decreasing). The regression model
used in our main test is as follows:

Variable Definitions:
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones
model proposed in Dechow et al. (1995). Appendix 1 provides the details.
DDA = an indicator variable that equals one if DA > 0, and zero if otherwise.
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimates of bid-ask spread
proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) computed over a period of 252
trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2
provides the details.
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big
8, and zero if otherwise.
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to
year t.
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t.
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation
and 1992.
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or
2001.
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater
than or equal to 2002, and zero if otherwise.
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1
provides the details.
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation
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EX_OPT =
UN_OPT =

GRNT_OPT =
OWNER =

received by the CEO and CFO of the firm in fiscal year t.
the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the
end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in
fiscal year t) that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by
total outstanding shares of the firm.
the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t
scaled by total outstanding shares.
the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the
aggregate number of shares held by CEO and CFO at the end of fiscal
year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.

H2 predicts that
3.5 Estimation Technique
We apply OLS regression to estimate equation (2), (3) and (4). All datasets used in our
analyses are panel data. Panel data generally exhibit cross-sectional (e.g. within-year) and serial
(e.g., within-firm) correlations for variables of interest (Gow et al. 2010; Petersen 2009;
Thompson 2011). Presence of cross-sectional and serial correlations generally leads to violation
of the common assumption of independence in regression errors and thus results in misspecified
test statistics. Gow et al. (2010) show that failure to correct for cross-sectional and time-series
dependence produces misspecified test statistics in common accounting research settings. To
ensure that our inferences are not confounded by misspecified test statistics induced by crosssectional and serial correlations, we follow the suggestion given in Gow et al. (2010), Petersen
(2009) and Thompson (2011) to apply two-way cluster-robust standard errors to compute test
statistics2. Specifically, we use standard errors clustered by firm and year to compute our test
statistics. Gow et al., (2010) show that the two-way cluster-robust standard errors are robust to
both serial and cross-sectional correlations (also see Cameron et al. 2008).

2

We thank Dr. Petersen for generously making his STATA code for calculating two-way
cluster-robust standard errors available online.
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4. DATA, SAMPLE, AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
To set up and estimate regression equation (1) – (4), we obtain financial, accounting, and
auditor-related data from COMPUSTAT, stock-related data from CRSP, CEO and CFO
compensation data from EXECCOMP, and GDP data from Bureau of Economic Analysis. In our
robustness and causality tests, we obtain analysts-related data from I/B/E/S, institutional
ownership data from Thomson CDA/Spectrum Institutional 13f Holdings, director-related and
governance provisions data from RISKMETRICS, and marginal tax rate from Prof. John
Graham3.
Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Zang Forthcoming), we exclude financial (SIC 60006999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999) firms from our sample. To maximize statistical power and
generalizability of our findings, we only require that a firm-year observation has no missing
values for variables used in the test to be included in one test. Therefore, different tests will have
different sample composition. In addition, in our analysis we exclude observations for which the
values of ratio-type variables such as operating cycles and return on assets are in the top or
bottom 0.5%. Panel A of Table 1 reports the year-by-year distribution of observations used in
our main test of H2.
For the sake of saving space, we only report summary statistics and correlations for
variables used in the main test of H2 because of the centrality of H2 in our study4. Panel B of
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for variables in our main test of H2. Overall, variables
used in our study to test H2 are comparable to those used in prior studies regarding statistical
distributions (e.g. Cohen et al. 2008).

3
4

We thank Dr. Gramham for generously making his marginal tax rate data available to us.
Summary statistics and correlations for variables used in other tests will be provided at request.
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Panel C of Table 1 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlations between variables used
in our main test of H2. We are cautious about drawing inferences from correlations between
discretionary accruals and other variables because of the inherent correlations between variables
that represent either motives for earnings management or determinants of discretionary accruals.
However, we want to provide a brief discussion of the correlation between stock liquidity
measure and discretionary accrual. Consistent with the prediction of H2, the correlation between
discretionary accruals and stock liquidity is positive when discretionary accruals are incomedecreasing (i.e., DA < 0), and negative when discretionary accruals are income-increasing (i.e.,
DA > 0).
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Sample Distribution
Year
N
%
1992
609 3.04%
1993
853 4.25%
1994
936 4.66%
1995
987 4.92%
1996
1049 5.23%
1997
1122 5.59%
1998
1141 5.69%
1999
1104 5.50%
2000
1060 5.28%
2001
1077 5.37%
2002
1107 5.52%
2003
1142 5.69%
2004
1132 5.64%
2005
1085 5.41%
2006
1128 5.62%
2007
1165 5.81%
2008
1138 5.67%
2009
1128 5.62%
2010
1102 5.49%
Total 20065 100.00%
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics - Continued
Panel B: Summary Statistics
N
DA
LIQ
BIG
ΔGDP
LMV
TIME
SCA
SOX
RM
BONUS
EX_OPT
UN_OPT
GRNT_OPT
OWNER

9335
9335
9335
9335
9335
9335
9335
9335
9335
9335
9335
9335
9335
9335

Mean
0.058
4.781
0.957
2.782
7.162
9.052
0.122
0.459
0.050
0.157
0.005
0.002
0.002
0.020

DA > 0
Std.
Q1 Median Q3
Dev.
0.068 0.017 0.038 0.074
0.506 4.422 4.795 5.149
0.203 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.797 1.900 3.000 4.100
1.597 6.040 6.950 8.110
5.127 5.000 9.000 13.000
0.327 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000
0.441 -0.119 0.061 0.268
0.159 0.000 0.128 0.250
0.009 0.001 0.003 0.007
0.004 0.000 0.001 0.002
0.004 0.000 0.001 0.002
0.050 0.001 0.003 0.013

N

Mean

10730 -0.068
10730 4.724
10730 0.956
10730 2.433
10730 7.132
10730 9.836
10730 0.093
10730 0.544
10730 -0.037
10730 0.142
10730 0.006
10730 0.002
10730 0.002
10730 0.017

DA < 0
Std.
Q1 Median Q3
Dev.
0.097 -0.083 -0.042 -0.019
0.528 4.354 4.737 5.109
0.205 1.000 1.000 1.000
2.053 1.900 2.900 3.700
1.617 6.011 6.970 8.124
5.400 5.000 10.000 15.000
0.291 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000
0.454 -0.218 0.000 0.192
0.154 0.000 0.100 0.234
0.009 0.001 0.003 0.007
0.004 0.000 0.001 0.002
0.004 0.000 0.001 0.002
0.045 0.001 0.003 0.011

Diff
0.126**
0.056**
0.001
0.349**
0.030
-0.784**
0.028**
-0.085**
0.087**
0.016**
0.000*
0.000
0.000**
0.003**

Panel C: Pairwise Pearson (Spearman) Correlations in Upper (Lower) Triangle
(1)
DA (1)
LIQ (2)
BIG (3)
ΔGDP (4)
LMV (5)
TIME (6)
SCA (7)
SOX (8)
RM (9)
BONUS (10)
EX_OPT (11)
UN_OPT (12)
GRNT_OPT (13)
OWNER (14)

-0.19
-0.02
0.08
-0.12
-0.05
0.08
-0.10
0.05
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.04
0.10

(2)
(3)
-0.20 -0.04
0.11
0.11
0.11 0.07
0.41 0.16
-0.10 -0.10
-0.17 0.04
0.00 -0.09
0.06 -0.01
0.17 0.02
-0.12 -0.03
-0.09 0.02
-0.11 0.02
-0.15 -0.09

DA > 0
(4)
(5)
(6)
0.08 -0.11 -0.05
0.18 0.40 -0.09
0.08 0.15 -0.10
-0.08 -0.56
-0.09
0.21
-0.52 0.22
-0.04 -0.01 -0.03
-0.58 0.19 0.86
0.01 0.00 0.07
0.26 0.01 -0.35
0.00 -0.27 0.10
0.05 -0.14 0.00
0.08 -0.17 -0.06
0.05 -0.31 -0.02
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(7)
0.09
-0.17
0.04
0.00
-0.01
-0.04
-0.34
0.03
0.03
0.05
0.11
0.12
-0.01

(8)
(9)
-0.10 -0.01
0.00 0.08
-0.09 0.01
-0.52 0.00
0.18 0.00
0.86 0.06
-0.34 0.02
0.05
0.05
-0.25 -0.03
0.09 0.02
-0.02 0.01
-0.10 -0.01
-0.04 0.01

(10)
0.02
0.15
0.01
0.25
-0.01
-0.29
0.01
-0.20
-0.01
-0.02
0.04
-0.12
-0.02

(11)
0.06
-0.12
-0.06
0.04
-0.25
0.01
0.03
0.02
-0.03
0.03

(12)
0.08
-0.09
0.00
0.08
-0.16
-0.07
0.06
-0.07
-0.04
0.07
0.21

0.42
0.36 0.314
0.16 0.05

(13)
0.09
-0.15
-0.02
0.08
-0.20
-0.10
0.06
-0.11
-0.05
-0.13
0.29
0.155
0.02

(14)
0.10
-0.08
-0.08
0.08
-0.17
-0.12
0.00
-0.12
-0.04
0.05
0.03
0.03
0.06

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics – Continued
(1)
DA (1)
LIQ (2)
BIG (3)
ΔGDP (4)
LMV (5)
TIME (6)
SCA (7)
SOX (8)
RM (9)
BONUS (10)
EX_OPT (11)
UN_OPT (12)
GRNT_OPT (13)
OWNER (14)

0.27
0.02
0.04
0.17
0.01
-0.03
0.03
0.11
0.08
-0.07
-0.06
-0.10
-0.04

(2)
(3)
0.26 0.02
0.10
0.10
0.21 0.06
0.48 0.15
-0.13 -0.10
-0.17 0.03
-0.05 -0.09
0.05 0.02
0.22 0.01
-0.15 -0.04
-0.12 0.02
-0.12 0.06
-0.15 -0.09

(4)
0.02
0.26
0.07
-0.03
-0.55
-0.07
-0.56
-0.05
0.31
-0.07
0.00
0.05
-0.02

DA < 0
(5)
(6)
0.13 0.02
0.46 -0.14
0.15 -0.10
-0.02 -0.57
0.14
0.15
-0.02 -0.10
0.14 0.86
0.01 0.08
0.04 -0.42
-0.26 0.14
-0.13 0.04
-0.16 -0.05
-0.28 0.03

(7)
-0.06
-0.17
0.03
-0.01
-0.02
-0.08
-0.35
0.00
0.05
0.03
0.07
0.10
-0.02

(8)
(9)
0.05 0.17
-0.05 0.06
-0.09 0.02
-0.49 -0.05
0.13 0.02
0.87 0.08
-0.35 0.00
0.08
0.08
-0.30 -0.04
0.16 -0.02
0.04 -0.04
-0.06 -0.03
0.02 0.00

(10)
0.08
0.20
-0.01
0.28
0.02
-0.35
0.03
-0.25
-0.03
-0.07
0.03
-0.13
-0.04

(11)
-0.04
-0.11
-0.09
-0.01
-0.25
0.05
0.02
0.07
-0.04
-0.01
0.39
0.33
0.17

(12)
-0.04
-0.09
0.01
0.05
-0.15
-0.05
0.04
-0.03
-0.05
0.06
0.22

(13)
-0.09
-0.15
0.01
0.07
-0.21
-0.10
0.06
-0.11
-0.08
-0.14
0.27
0.09

0.26
0.07 -0.02

(14)
-0.01
-0.08
-0.08
0.06
-0.12
-0.11
-0.01
-0.10
-0.05
0.04
0.00
0.00
-0.01

Correlations Significantly Different from Zero at p-Values Less Than 0.05 Are in Boldface Type
Panel A of Table 1 reports the year-by-year distribution of observations used to test H2.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the variables used to test H2.
Panel C of Table 1 reports the pairwise Pearson/Spearman correlations between variables used to
test H2.
Variable Definitions:
DA
= measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones
model proposed in Dechow et al. (1995). Appendix 1 provides the details.
LIQ
= the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimates of bid-ask spread
proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) computed over a period of 252
trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 provides
the details.
BIG
= an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8,
and zero if otherwise.
ΔGDP
= the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year
t.
LMV
= the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t.
TIME
= a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and
1992.
SCA
= an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or
2001.
SOX
= an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than
or equal to 2002, and zero if otherwise.
RM
= measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 provides
the details.
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation
received by the CEO and CFO of the firm in fiscal year t.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics – Continued
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end
of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
UN_OP = the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in
T
fiscal year t) that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total
outstanding shares of the firm.
GRNT_ = the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled
OPT
by total outstanding shares.
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the
aggregate number of shares held by CEO and CFO at the end of fiscal year t
scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
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5. RESULTS
5.1 H1: Stock Liquidity and Future Earnings Response Coefficient
Following Aiken and West’s (1991) suggestion, we center our stock liquidity measure on
its sample mean before we generate the interaction term between stock liquidity and changes in
future earnings. Centering our stock liquidity measure on its sample mean makes regression
coefficients on changes in future earnings empirically meaningful because in our sample stock
liquidity measure is always positive (see Aiken and West 1991). Furthermore, centering our
stock liquidity measure on its sample mean can mitigate potential collinearity problems
associated with inclusion of interaction terms in the regression equation (see Aiken and West
1991).
Table 2 reports the OLS estimates of equation (2) and (3). Consistent with the prediction
of H1, the regression coefficients on the interaction terms between stock liquidity and changes in
future earnings are positive, suggesting that as stock liquidity increases contemporaneous
variations in stock prices will be more driven by changes in future earnings.
Following Aiken and West’s (1991) suggestion we draw Figure 1 to illustrate how the
regression coefficient on changes in future earnings (fiscal year t+1) varies with the magnitude of
stock liquidity. From equation (2) we can get 5

Therefore,
̂

̂

̂

And
5

Derivation is the same when referring to equation (3).
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Table 2
Stock Liquidity and Future Earnings Response Coefficient (Gelb and Zarowin 2002)

Variables
Intercept
E/Pt-1

Dependent Variable - RETt
Expected
Model 1
Sign
?
0.182**
+
0.733**

Model 2
0.181**
0.705**

AGt

+

0.213**

LMVt

-

-0.018**

-0.019*

RETt+1

-

-0.140**

-0.139**

RETt+2

-

-0.044**

-0.044**

RETt+3

-

-0.064**

-0.063**

ΔEt

+

1.101**

1.101**

ΔEt+1

+

1.285**

1.389**

ΔEt+2

+

0.260**

0.300**

ΔEt+3

+

0.107*

0.127**

LIQt

?

-0.001

LIQt x ΔEt

+

-0.009

LIQt x ΔEt+1

+

0.229**

LIQt x ΔEt+2

+

0.102*

LIQt x ΔEt+3
N

+

0.051
91644
0.145

91644
0.143

2

0.210**

R
Note: t-statistics are computed by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test
Table 2 reports the results of regression of contemporaneous annualized stock returns on the
interaction term(s) between stock liquidity and changes in earnings and other control variables.
Variable Definitions:
RETt+j = annualized stock return that starts from the fourth month after the end of
fiscal year t+j-1, j=0, 1, 2, 3.
ΔEt+j = change in income before extraordinary items from fiscal year t+j-1 to
fiscal year t+j scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of
fiscal year t+j, j=0, 1, 2, 3.
E/Pt = the ratio of income before extraordinary items of fiscal year t to the
market value of equity at the beginning of fiscal year t.
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Table 2
Stock Liquidity and Future Earnings Response Coefficient (Gelb and Zarowin 2002) –
Continued
AGt = growth rate of total assets from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t.
LMVt = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t.
LIQt = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimate of bid-ask spread
proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) computed over a period of 252
trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 1 provides
the details.
(

̂

)

√

We obtain ̂ , ̂ ,

̂
̂,

̂

̂ ̂

̂ and

̂ ̂ from OLS estimates of

equation (2). In our sample, the magnitude of stock liquidity ranges from 0.82 to 7.74. To draw
Figure 1, we use the range of 0.50 to 8.0 to ensure that the value range of stock liquidity better
represents the population. Figure 1 clearly shows that as stock liquidity increases the relationship
between contemporaneous variations in stock prices and changes in future earnings strengthens.
As evident in Figure 1, when stock liquidity is below certain value (about 2.0 in our sample)
is not statistically different from zero. In other words, when stock liquidity is very low
(i.e., less than 2.0 in our sample) contemporaneous variations in stock prices convey no
information about changes in future earnings (fiscal year t+1)6.
5.2 H2: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals
To gain first-hand insight into the relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary
accruals, we draw Figure 2 for a direct illustration of the relationship between stock liquidity and
discretionary accruals. To draw Figure 2, we sort all observations with no missing values for
both stock liquidity and discretionary accruals measures into five equal groups according to the
6

For changes in earnings for fiscal year t+2 and t+3, we come to qualitatively the same
conclusion after following the same procedure to draw figures.
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magnitude of stock liquidity (larger group number means higher stock liquidity), and
independently sort the same set of observations into two groups according to the sign of
discretionary accruals. In total, 75003 firm-year observations are used to draw Figure 2 and
36568 firm-year observations have positive discretionary accruals.
Figure 2 exhibits several interesting patterns regarding the relationship between stock
liquidity and discretionary accruals. First, consistent with the prediction of H2, Figure 2 reveals a
positive relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals when discretionary
accruals are negative, and a negative relationship when discretionary accruals are positive,
suggesting that as stock liquidity increases and consequently stock prices become more efficient
firms will engage in less AEM.
β(ΔEt+1) vs. Liquidity
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Figure 1
Stock Liquidity and Future Earnings Response Coefficient (Gelb and Zarowin 2002)
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Figure 2
Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals: Cross-sectional Evidence
Figure 2 depicts the cross-sectional relationship between stock liquidity and the magnitude and
standard deviation of discretionary accruals. To draw Figure 2, we separate observations into two
groups according to the sign of their discretionary accruals, and sort all observations into five
equal groups according to the magnitude of stock liquidity.

Second, the strength of the relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals
is stronger when discretionary accruals are negative than when discretionary accruals are positive.
We argue that the differential strengths regarding the effect of stock liquidity on AEM may stem
from the fact that it is more costly and risky for investors to engage in short arbitrage than in
long arbitrage. Holding everything else equal, positive discretionary accruals are likely to cause
overvaluation while negative discretionary accruals are likely to generate undervaluation. In the
presence of overvaluation, arbitrage requires short sale of shares while in the presence of
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undervaluation, arbitrage requires taking a long position. In practice, it is more costly and risky
to engage in short arbitrage than in long arbitrage (Hirshleifer et al. 2011). Therefore, the effect
of stock liquidity on price efficiency is less significant in the presence of resulting from incomeincreasing AEM than in the presence of undervaluation brought about by income-decreasing
AEM. Furthermore, Figure 2 shows that the standard deviation of discretionary accruals declines
as stock liquidity increases, suggesting that as stock liquidity increases and consequently prices
become more efficient firms not only engage in less AEM but also engage in less extreme AEM.
Table 3 reports the OLS estimates of regression equation (4). Consistent with the
prediction of our H2, the coefficient on stock liquidity is positive when discretionary accruals are
negative, and negative when discretionary accruals are positive. Regardless of the sign of
discretionary accruals, the regression coefficients on stock liquidity are statistically significant.
Moreover, consistent with the pattern revealed in Figure 2, the absolute value of regression
coefficient on stock liquidity when DA < 0 is greater than that on stock liquidity when DA > 0.
Moreover, not only there is difference regarding the strength of the relationship between stock
liquidity and AEM between DA < 0 and DA >0, but also the difference is statistically significant
(i.e. p < 0.01).

Furthermore, the impact of stock liquidity on AEM is also economically

significant. When stock liquidity increases from half standard deviation below the sample mean
to half standard deviation above the sample mean, discretionary accruals will be reduced by
0.013 (22.37% of the sample mean) when DA > 0; discretionary accruals will be increased by
0.022 (33.58% of the sample mean ) when DA < 0.
Our findings about other determinants of AEM are generally consistent with those of
prior studies (e.g. Cohen et al. 2008). Here, in our interpretation of regression coefficients on
other determinants of AEM we focus on coefficients that are statistically significant. After
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controlling for other determinants, the period after SOX was characterized by lower AEM, and
the decrease in AEM mainly resulted from reduction in income-increasing AEM. As turned out
in our sample, income-increasing AEM increases over time while there is no clear trend for
income-decreasing AEM. We find no significant impact of Big 8 auditing firms on AEM while
the sign of the regression coefficient on Big 8 is consistent with theoretical expectation (i.e.
negative when DA > 0 and positive when DA < 0). The finding about firm size (LMV) is similar
to that for Big 8. Consistent with Cohen et al. (2008) we find no significant direct evidence that
AEM is greater during accounting scandal period (SCA = 1). We document a significant,
positive relationship between REM and AEM when DA < 0 suggesting a substitution effect
between AEM and REM when DA < 0. We find no significant relationship between REM and
AEM when DA > 0. Different from Cohen et al. (2008) we document a significant positive
relationship between change in real gross domestic product (ΔGDP) and AEM when DA > 0,
suggesting that DA is higher when overall macroeconomic situation is better.
We document a significant positive relationship between the average bonus awarded to
CEO and CFO (BONUS) as percentage of total compensation and AEM when DA > 0 during
pre-SCA and post-SOX periods, and no statistically significant during accounting scandal period
(i.e. SCA = 1). We find no statistically significant relationship between BONUS and AEM when
DA < 0 during pre-SCA period, and statistically significant positive relationship between
BONUS and AEM during SCA and post-SOX periods.
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Table 3
Main Test: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals

Variables

Coeff.

Variables

Coeff.

Intercept
BIG
ΔGDP
LMV
Time
SCA
SOX
RM
BONUS
BONUS x SCA
BONUS x SOX
UN_OPT
UN_OPT x SCA
UN_OPT x SOX
GRNT_OPT
GRNT_OPT x SCA
GRNT_OPT x SOX
EX_OPT
EX_OPT x SCA
EX_OPT x SOX
OWNER
OWNER x SCA
OWNER x SOX
LIQ

-0.066**
0.001
-0.001
0.001
0.000
-0.007
0.003
0.032**
0.023
0.089
0.004
-0.588
-1.267
0.736
-0.673
1.076
-0.155
-0.192
0.307
0.432
0.018
0.144*
0.071
0.044**

DDA
DDA x BIG
DDA x ΔGDP
DDA x LMV
DDA x Time
DDA x SCA
DDA x SOX
DDA x RM
DDA x BONUS
DDA x BONUS x SCA
DDA x BONUS x SOX
DDA x UN_OPT
DDA x UN_OPT x SCA
DDA x UN_OPT x SOX
DDA x GRNT_OPT
DDA x GRNT_OPT x SCA
DDA x GRNT_OPT x SOX
DDA x EX_OPT
DDA x EX_OPT x SCA
DDA x EX_OPT x SOX
DDA x OWNER
DDA x OWNER x SCA
DDA x OWNER x SOX
DDA x LIQ
N

0.137**
-0.008
0.005**
-0.001
0.001
0.013
-0.022†
-0.030**
-0.010
-0.108
0.009
1.647*
2.250
-2.171**
1.603
-2.326*
0.512
0.346
-0.719
-0.485
0.100†
-0.176*
-0.148*
-0.069**
20065

2

R

0.412
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Intercept
BIG
ΔGDP
LMV
Time
SCA
SOX
RM
BONUS
BONUS x SCA
BONUS x SOX
UN_OPT
UN_OPT x SCA
UN_OPT x SOX
GRNT_OPT
GRNT_OPT x SCA
GRNT_OPT x SOX
EX_OPT
EX_OPT x SCA
EX_OPT x SOX
OWNER
OWNER x SCA
OWNER x SOX
LIQ

DA > 0

DA < 0

0.070**
-0.006
0.003**
-0.000
0.002**
0.005
-0.018**
0.002
0.013*
-0.020
0.013
1.059**
0.983
-1.435**
0.930
-1.251†
0.356
0.154
-0.413
-0.053
0.118**
-0.032
-0.077†
-0.025**

-0.066**
0.001
-0.001
0.001
0.000
-0.007
0.003
0.032**
0.023
0.089
0.004
-0.588
-1.267
0.736
-0.673
1.076
-0.155
-0.192
0.307
0.432
0.018
0.144*
0.071
0.044**

Table 3
Main Test: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued
Note: t-statistics are computed by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test
Table 3 reports the OLS regression results of the main test of H2.
Variable Definitions:
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones model proposed in Dechow et al. (1995).
Appendix 1 provides the details.
DDA = an indicator variable that equals one if DA > 0, and zero if otherwise.
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimates of bid-ask spread proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012)
computed over a period of 252 trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 provides the
details.
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8, and zero if otherwise.
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year t.
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t.
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and 1992.
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 2001.
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than or equal to 2002, and zero if
otherwise.
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 provides the details.
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the CEO and CFO of the firm
in fiscal year t.
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total
outstanding shares of the firm.
UN_OPT = the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in fiscal year t) that CEO and CFO held at
the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
GRNT_OPT = the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares.
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the aggregate number of shares held by CEO
and CFO at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
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We documented no significant relationship between the average options granted to CEO
and CFO (GRNT_OPT) as percentage of total outstanding shares and AEM when DA > 0 during
pre-SCA and SCA periods even though the drop in the strength of the relationship between
GRNT_OPT and AEM when DA > 0 is negative and marginally significant. During post-SOX
period, the relationship between GRNT_OPT and AEM is positive and marginally statistically
significant when DA > 0. We find a statistically significant negative relationship between
GRNT_OPT and AEM when DA < 0 during post-SOX period, and no statistically significant
relationship during pre-SCA and SCA periods.
We document no significant relationship between the average exercisable stock options
held by CEO and CFO (EX_OPT) as percentage of total outstanding shares and AEM regardless
of the sign of DA and observation periods. Our finding about the relationship between EX_OPT
and AEM is consistent with Cheng and Warfield’s (2005) argument that equity incentives
leading to earnings management arise from future trading in the company’s stock, and
exercisable options involve no future trading in the company’s stock.
We document a significant positive relationship between the average of CEO’s and
CFO’s stock ownership (OWNER) as percentage of total outstanding shares and AEM during
pre-SCA and SCA periods, and no significant relationship between OWNER and AEM after the
passage of SOX when DA > 0. We find no significant relationship between OWNER and AEM
during pre-SCA period, and significant positive relationship between OWNER and AEM during
SCA and post-SOX periods when DA < 0. In summary, our findings about the relationship
between components of CEOs’ and CFOs’ compensation and AEM are consistent with prior
studies (e.g. Cheng and Warfield 2005; Cohen et al. 2008; Healy 1985), and are theoretically
sensible.

38

5.3 Robustness Tests
5.3.1 Robustness Test: Stock Liquidity and Future Earnings Response Coefficients
To ensure that our finding about H1 is robust to the empirical model used, we do
robustness test of H1 by using the model proposed in Lundholm and Myers (2002). The model
proposed in Lundholm and Myers (2002) is also adapted from Collins et al. (1994), and has been
widely used in prior studies (e.g., Choi et al. 2011; Orpurt and Zang 2009; Tucker and Zarowin
2006). Consistent with prior studies, we control for firm size, sign of earnings, asset growth,
institutional ownership, analysts following, and earnings volatility. Prior studies show that these
firm-related characteristics affect price informativeness about future earnings. We refer readers
to prior studies (e.g., Choi et al. 2011; Tucker and Zarowin 2006) for justifications of
controlling-for these firm-related characteristics.
However, firm size, institutional ownership, and analyst following are arguably
associated with or related to stock liquidity. For instance, stock liquidity encourages the
formation of large blockholdings and thus increases institutional ownership (Edmans et al. 2011),
and analysts following is related to institutional holdings (Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1995).
While we acknowledge that firm size matters with respect to price informativenss about future
earnigns we argue that we should care more about why firm size matters. Therefore, because of
the centrality of stock liquidity as a microstructure mechanism contributing to price efficiency in
our study we orthogonalize institutional ownership, and analyst following over stock liquidity
before including them in the empirical model. The empirical model for robustness test of H1 is
as follows:
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Where, for fiscal year t and firm i,
RETt = annualized stock return that starts from the fourth month after the end of
fiscal year t-1.
Et+j = the income available to common shareholders before extraordinary items for
fiscal year t+j, j=-1, 0 deflated by the market value of equity at the beginning
of fiscal year t.
Et3 = the sum of income available to common shareholders before extraordinary
items for fiscal years t+1 through t+3 deflated by the market value of equity at
the beginning of fiscal year t.
RETt3 = the cumulative stock return over the three-year period that starts in the fourth
month after fiscal year t.
LIQt = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimate of bid-ask spread
proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) computed over a period of 252
trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 1 provides
the details.
AGt = growth rate of total assets from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t.
R_LMVt = the estimated residual from the following regression: LMVt = ß0 + ß1 * LIQt
+ εt where LMVt is the natural log of the market value of equity at the
beginning of fiscal year t.
STD_Et = the standard deviation of the income available to common shareholders before
extraordinary items for fiscal years t through t+3.
D_LOSSt = an indicator variable that equals one if Et3 < 0 and equals zero if otherwise.
R_LCOVt = the estimated residual from the following regression: LCOVt = ß0 + ß1 * LIQt
+ εt where LCOVt is the natural log of (one plus the number of analysts
following the firm in the three months prior to earnings announcement for
fiscal year t).
R_IOt = the estimated residual from the following regression: IOt = ß0 + ß1 * LIQt + εt
where IOt is the proportion of shares held by institutional investors at the end
of the calendar quarter closest to the end of fiscal year t.

H1 predicts that

. Table 4 reports the results of OLS estimate of equation (8).

Consistent with the prediction of H1, we find that ̂

. That is, our empirical finding about

the validity of H1 is robust to the choice of a different empirical model. In addition, we draw
Figure 3 by following the procedure used to draw Figure 1. Figure 3 reveals an empirical pattern
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that is qualitatively similar to that revealed in Figure 1. That is, when stock liquidity is rather low
contemporaneous variations in stock prices convey no information about changes in future
earnings (fiscal year t+1 to t+3); as stock liquidity increases future earnings response coefficient
increases.
Table 4
Robustness Test: Stock Liquidity and Future Earnings Response Coefficient (Lundholm and
Myers 2002)
Variables
Intercept
Et-1

Dependent Variable - RETt
Expected
Model 1
Sign
?
0.072*
-0.925**

Model 2
0.079*
-0.974**

Et

+

0.689**

0.560**

Et3

+

0.560**

0.583**

RETt3

-

-0.083**

-0.081**

R_LMVt

-

-0.042**

-0.041**

R_LMVt × Et3

+

0.002

0.002

AGt

+

0.186**

0.179**

AGt × Et3

-

0.013

0.011

STD_Et

?

0.616**

0.675**

STD_Et × Et3

-

-0.395**

-0.408**

D_LOSSt

-

-0.112**

-0.099**

D_LOSSt × Et3

-

-0.671**

-0.663**

R_LCOVt

?

0.038**

0.037**

R_LOVt × Et3

+

0.040*

0.039*

R_IOt

?

0.014

0.005

R_IOt × Et3

+

0.263**

0.269**

LIQt

?

LIQt × Et-1

?

-0.057

LIQt × Et

?

-0.215**

LIQt × Et3
N

+

0.036**
93020
0.186

0.027*

93020
0.184

2

R
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Table 4
Robustness Test: Stock Liquidity and Future Earnings Response Coefficient (Lundholm and
Myers 2002) - Continued
Note: t-statistics are calculated by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test
Table 4 reports the results of the robustness test of the relationship between stock liquidity and
future earnings response coefficient by using the method proposed in Lundholm and Myers
(2002).
Variable Definitions:
RETt = annualized stock return that starts from the fourth month after the end of
fiscal year t-1.
Et+j = the income available to common shareholders before extraordinary items for
fiscal year t+j, j=-1, 0 deflated by the market value of equity at the beginning
of fiscal year t.
Et3 = the sum of income available to common shareholders before extraordinary
items for fiscal years t+1 through t+3 deflated by the market value of equity at
the beginning of fiscal year t.
RETt3 = the cumulative stock return over the three-year period that starts in the fourth
month after fiscal year t.
LIQt = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimate of bid-ask spread
proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) computed over a period of 252
trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 1 provides
the details.
AGt = growth rate of total assets from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t.
R_LMVt = the estimated residual from the following regression: LMVt = ß0 + ß1 * LIQt
+ εt where LMVt is the natural log of the market value of equity at the
beginning of fiscal year t.
STD_Et = the standard deviation of the income available to common shareholders before
extraordinary items for fiscal years t through t+3.
D_LOSSt = an indicator variable that equals one if Et3 < 0 and equals zero if otherwise.
R_LCOVt = the estimated residual from the following regression: LCOVt = ß0 + ß1 * LIQt
+ εt where LCOVt is the natural log of (one plus the number of analysts
following the firm in the three months prior to earnings announcement for
fiscal year t).
R_IOt = the estimated residual from the following regression: IOt = ß0 + ß1 * LIQt + εt
where IOt is the proportion of shares held by institutional investors at the end
of the calendar quarter closest to the end of fiscal year t.
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Figure 3
Robustness Analysis: Stock Liquidity and Future Earnings Response Coefficient (Lundholm and
Myers 2002)
Figure 3 depicts how future earnings response coefficient varies with the level of stock liquidity.

5.3.2 Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Accruals-Based Earnings Management
We run a battery of robust tests of H2. First, to ensure that our finding about H2 is not
driven by the way in which we set up our regression model, we follow Cohen et al. (2008) to do
the following two robustness tests: use the absolute value of discretionary accruals as the
dependent variable and run the regression separately for observations with positive and negative
discretionary accruals. As evident in the results reported in the Panel A and Panel B of Table 5,
estimates of regression coefficients and respective test statistics remain unchanged regardless of
the way in which we set up the regression model for testing H2 and run the regression analysis.
43

We argue that the results reported in the Panel A and Panel B of Table 5 are not surprising
because the flexibility inherent in the original regression setup already implies the results of
these two robustness tests.
We adopt alternative regression models of normal accruals to estimate discretionary
accruals and examine whether our finding about H2 is robust to the way in which discretionary
accruals are calculated. We use Dechow et al.’s (2003) (hereafter, DRT) model to estimate the
normal level of total accruals (i.e. nondiscretionary accruals). DRT arguably improves the
modified Jones model in several aspects. First, DRT explicitly models and thus captures the
expected change in credit sales for a given change in sales rather than presumes that all credit
sales are discretionary. Second, DRT includes lagged total accruals to control for the predicted
proportion of total accruals. Third, DRT includes next-year’s sales growth to capture the increase
in inventory that is related to growth prospects. We also use the original Jones model proposed in
Jones (1991) to estimate the normal level of total accruals. As shown in results reported in Panel
C and Panel D of Table 5, our finding regarding H2 remains unchanged.
Instead of using two-digit SIC codes to classify the industry membership of firm-year
observations we adopt the latest Fama-French industry classification scheme (49 industries in
total) to estimate the modified Jones model. As shown in results reported in the Panel E of Table
5, our finding about the empirical validity of H2 remains essentially unchanged
To further ensure that our finding about H2 is not sensitive to our choice of stock
liquidity measure, we adopt the stock liquidity measure proposed in Amihud (2002) and the
stock liquidity measure proposed in Hasbrouck (2009) to rerun our main test of H2. Appendix 2
provides brief technical background of each stock liquidity measure. As shown in the results
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reported in Panel F and Panel G of Table 5, our finding regarding H2 remains unchanged
regardless of the stock liquidity measures used.
In summary, our finding about H2 is robust to the way in which we set up the regression
model for testing H2, to the application of alternative total accruals models to estimate
discretionary accruals, to the application of different industry classification schemes, and to the
use of different stock liquidity measures.
5.4 Causality Analysis: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals
As evident in our review of the literature about the relationship between stock liquidity
and price efficiency and in our development of H2, the relationship between stock liquidity and
AEM is theoretically sound. However, the findings of prior studies suggest that there is possible
reversal causality between stock liquidity and AEM. For instance, Lang et al. (Forthcoming) find
that greater stock liquidity is associated with less earnings management. Moreover, endogeneity
problems are ubiquitous in empirical studies. In our research setting, it is possible that third
variables drive the empirical relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals
documented by us. For example, Chung et al. (2010) find that greater stock liquidity is associated
with better corporate governance. Chung et al. (2010) attributed their finding to the possibility
that effective governance enhances financial and operational transparency, and thus decreases
information asymmetries between insiders and outside investors as well as among outside
investors. The findings of prior studies (e.g. Ghosh et al. 2010; Klein 2002) suggest that better
corporate governance can mitigate accruals-based earnings management. Therefore, it is
arguable that variation in underlying corporate governance may drive the empirical relationship
between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals documented in our study.
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Table 5
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals
Panel A: Use of Absolute Value of DA (ADA) as Dependent Variable
Variables
Intercept
BIG
ΔGDP
LMV
Time
SCA
SOX
RM
BONUS
BONUS x SCA
BONUS x SOX
UN_OPT
UN_OPT x SCA
UN_OPT x SOX
GRNT_OPT
GRNT_OPT x SCA
GRNT_OPT x SOX
EX_OPT
EX_OPT x SCA
EX_OPT x SOX
OWNER
OWNER x SCA
OWNER x SOX
LIQ

Coeff.
0.066**
-0.001
0.001
-0.001
-0.000
0.007
-0.003
-0.032**
-0.023
-0.089
-0.004
0.588
1.267
-0.736
0.673
-1.076
0.155
0.192
-0.307
-0.432
-0.018
-0.144*
-0.071
-0.044**

Variables
DDA
DDA x BIG
DDA x ΔGDP
DDA x LMV
DDA x Time
DDA x SCA
DDA x SOX
DDA x RM
DDA x BONUS
DDA x BONUS x SCA
DDA x BONUS x SOX
DDA x UN_OPT
DDA x UN_OPT x SCA
DDA x UN_OPT x SOX
DDA x GRNT_OPT
DDA x GRNT_OPT x SCA
DDA x GRNT_OPT x SOX
DDA x EX_OPT
DDA x EX_OPT x SCA
DDA x EX_OPT x SOX
DDA x OWNER
DDA x OWNER x SCA
DDA x OWNER x SOX
DDA x LIQ
N
R2

Coeff.
0.004
-0.005
0.002*
0.001
0.002**
-0.002
-0.015†
0.034**
0.036*
0.069†
0.017
0.470
-0.285
-0.699
0.257
-0.175
0.201
-0.037
0.145
0.128
0.136**
0.112*
-0.006
0.019**
20065
0.095
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DA > 0
Intercept
0.070**
BIG
-0.006
ΔGDP
0.003**
LMV
-0.000
Time
0.002**
SCA
0.005
SOX
-0.018**
RM
0.002
BONUS
0.013*
BONUS x SCA
-0.020
BONUS x SOX
0.013
UN_OPT
1.059**
UN_OPT x SCA
0.983
UN_OPT x SOX
-1.435**
GRNT_OPT
0.930
GRNT_OPT x SCA -1.251†
GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.356
EX_OPT
0.154
EX_OPT x SCA
-0.162
EX_OPT x SOX
-0.304
OWNER
0.118**
OWNER x SCA
-0.032
OWNER x SOX
-0.077†
LIQ
-0.025**

DA < 0
0.066**
-0.001
0.001
-0.001
-0.000
0.007
-0.003
-0.032**
-0.023
-0.089
-0.004
0.588
1.267
-0.736
0.673
-1.076
0.155
0.192
-0.307
-0.432
-0.018
-0.144*
-0.071
-0.044**

Table 5
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued
Note: t-statistics are computed by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test
Panel A of Table 5 reports the OLS regression results of the robustness test of H2 that uses the absolute value of discretionary accruals
as the dependent variable.
Variable Definitions:
ADA = absolute value of DA. DA is the measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones model
proposed in Dechow et al. (1995). Appendix 1 provides the details.
DDA = an indicator variable that equals one if DA > 0, and zero if otherwise
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimates of bid-ask spread proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012)
computed over a period of 252 trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 provides the
details.
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8, and zero if otherwise.
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year t.
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t.
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and 1992.
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 2001.
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than or equal to 2002, and zero if
otherwise.
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 provides the details.
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the CEO and CFO of the firm
in fiscal year t.
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total
outstanding shares of the firm.
UN_OPT = the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in fiscal year t) that CEO and CFO held at
the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
GRNT_OPT = the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares.
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the aggregate number of shares held by CEO
and CFO at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
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Table 5
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued
Panel B: Run the Regression Analysis Separately for Positive and Negative DA Observations
Variables
DA > 0
DA < 0
Intercept
0.070** -0.066**
BIG
-0.006
0.001
ΔGDP
0.003** -0.001
LMV
-0.000
0.001
Time
0.002** 0.000
SCA
0.005
-0.007
SOX
-0.018** 0.003
RM
0.002
0.032**
BONUS
0.013*
0.023
BONUS x SCA
-0.020
0.089
BONUS x SOX
0.013
0.004
UN_OPT
1.059** -0.588
UN_OPT x SCA
0.983
-1.267
UN_OPT x SOX
-1.435** 0.736
GRNT_OPT
0.930
-0.673
GRNT_OPT x SCA -1.251†
1.076
GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.356
-0.155
EX_OPT
0.154
-0.192
EX_OPT x SCA
-0.178
0.307
EX_OPT x SOX
-0.287
0.432
OWNER
0.118** 0.018
OWNER x SCA
-0.032
0.144*
OWNER x SOX
-0.077†
0.071
LIQ
-0.025** 0.044**
N
9335
10730

R2
0.073
0.100
Note: t-statistics are computed by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test
Panel B of Table 5 reports the OLS regression results of the robustness test of H2 that sorts
observations into two groups according to the sign of discretionary accruals estimates and runs
the regression separately for both groups.
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Table 5
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued
Variable Definitions:
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones
model proposed in Dechow et al. (1995). Appendix 1 provides the details.
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimates of bid-ask spread
proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) computed over a period of 252 trading
days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 provides the
details.
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8,
and zero if otherwise.
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year
t.
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t.
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and
1992.
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 2001.
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than
or equal to 2002, and zero if otherwise.
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 provides
the details.
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation
received by the CEO and CFO of the firm in fiscal year t.
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end
of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
UN_OPT = the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in
fiscal year t) that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total
outstanding shares of the firm.
GRNT_OPT = the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled
by total outstanding shares.
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the
aggregate number of shares held by CEO and CFO at the end of fiscal year t
scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
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Table 5
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued
Panel C: Adopt the Modified Jones Model Proposed in Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003) to Estimate Discretionary Accruals
Variables
Coeff.
Variables
Coeff.
DA > 0
DA < 0
Intercept
-0.070** DDA
0.133** Intercept
0.063** -0.070**
BIG
0.004
DDA x BIG
-0.009
BIG
-0.005
0.004
ΔGDP
-0.002** DDA x ΔGDP
0.004** ΔGDP
0.002** -0.002**
LMV
0.002† DDA x LMV
-0.003† LMV
-0.001
0.002†
Time
-0.001
DDA x Time
0.002† Time
0.001* -0.001
SCA
0.000
DDA x SCA
0.000
SCA
-0.001
0.000
SOX
0.012
DDA x SOX
-0.027* SOX
-0.015** 0.012
RM
0.027** DDA x RM
-0.028** RM
0.000
0.027**
BONUS
0.019
DDA x BONUS
-0.008
BONUS
0.012*
0.019
BONUS x SCA
0.062† DDA x BONUS x SCA
-0.076† BONUS x SCA
-0.014†
0.062†
BONUS x SOX
0.003
DDA x BONUS x SOX
-0.005
BONUS x SOX
-0.002
0.003
UN_OPT
-0.365
DDA x UN_OPT
1.478* UN_OPT
1.113** -0.365
UN_OPT x SCA
-0.637
DDA x UN_OPT x SCA
0.187
UN_OPT x SCA
-0.449
-0.637
UN_OPT x SOX
0.573
DDA x UN_OPT x SOX
-1.333† UN_OPT x SOX
-0.760
0.573
GRNT_OPT
-0.933† DDA x GRNT_OPT
1.649† GRNT_OPT
0.715
-0.933†
GRNT_OPT x SCA 0.947
DDA x GRNT_OPT x SCA -0.819
GRNT_OPT x SCA 0.128
0.947
GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.193
DDA x GRNT_OPT x SOX -0.018
GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.175
0.193
EX_OPT
-0.281
DDA x EX_OPT
0.479† EX_OPT
0.197
-0.281
EX_OPT x SCA
0.469
DDA x EX_OPT x SCA
-0.712
EX_OPT x SCA
-0.243
0.469
EX_OPT x SOX
0.491
DDA x EX_OPT x SOX
-0.773* EX_OPT x SOX
-0.282
0.491
OWNER
-0.001
DDA x OWNER
0.084* OWNER
0.083** -0.001
OWNER x SCA
0.115* DDA x OWNER x SCA
-0.079
OWNER x SCA
0.037
0.115*
OWNER x SOX
0.095** DDA x OWNER x SOX
-0.134* OWNER x SOX
-0.039
0.095**
LIQ
0.036** DDA x LIQ
-0.059** LIQ
-0.023** 0.036**
N
18218
2
R
0.420
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Table 5
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued
Note: t-statistics are computed by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test
Panel C of Table 5 reports the OLS regression results of the robustness test of H2 that adopts the modified Jones model proposed in
Dechow et al. (2003) to estimate discretionary accruals.
Variable Definitions:
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones model proposed in Dechow et al. (2003).
Appendix 1 provides the details.
DDA = an indicator variable that equals one if DA > 0, and zero if otherwise
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimates of bid-ask spread proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012)
computed over a period of 252 trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 provides the
details.
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8, and zero if otherwise.
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year t.
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t.
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and 1992.
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 2001.
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than or equal to 2002, and zero if
otherwise.
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 provides the details.
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the CEO and CFO of the firm
in fiscal year t.
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total
outstanding shares of the firm.
UN_OPT = the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in fiscal year t) that CEO and CFO held at
the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
GRNT_OPT = the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares.
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the aggregate number of shares held by CEO
and CFO at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
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Table 5
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued
Panel D: Adopt the Jones Model Proposed in Jones (1991) to Estimate Discretionary Accruals
Variables
Intercept
BIG
ΔGDP
LMV
Time
SCA
SOX
RM
BONUS
BONUS x SCA
BONUS x SOX
UN_OPT
UN_OPT x SCA
UN_OPT x SOX
GRNT_OPT
GRNT_OPT x SCA
GRNT_OPT x SOX
EX_OPT
EX_OPT x SCA
EX_OPT x SOX
OWNER
OWNER x SCA
OWNER x SOX
LIQ

Coeff.
-0.065**
0.003
-0.003*
-0.000
0.000
-0.020
0.000
0.041**
0.012
0.163
0.018
-0.363
-0.588
0.571
-1.096**
1.456
0.881†
-0.156
-0.055
0.447
-0.033
0.189*
0.112
0.044**

Variables
DDA
DDA x BIG
DDA x ΔGDP
DDA x LMV
DDA x Time
DDA x SCA
DDA x SOX
DDA x RM
DDA x BONUS
DDA x BONUS x SCA
DDA x BONUS x SOX
DDA x UN_OPT
DDA x UN_OPT x SCA
DDA x UN_OPT x SOX
DDA x GRNT_OPT
DDA x GRNT_OPT x SCA
DDA x GRNT_OPT x SOX
DDA x EX_OPT
DDA x EX_OPT x SCA
DDA x EX_OPT x SOX
DDA x OWNER
DDA x OWNER x SCA
DDA x OWNER x SOX
DDA x LIQ
N
R2

Coeff.
0.145**
-0.011
0.006*
0.001
0.002
0.038
-0.019
-0.032**
0.004
-0.182
-0.016
1.273†
2.569
-1.538†
2.025*
-2.659
-0.502
0.487
-0.559
-0.361
0.133
-0.183*
-0.169
-0.068**
20065
0.365
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DA > 0
Intercept
0.080**
BIG
-0.008
ΔGDP
0.003**
LMV
0.001
Time
0.002**
SCA
0.018†
SOX
-0.019**
RM
0.009†
BONUS
0.016*
BONUS x SCA
-0.019
BONUS x SOX
0.001
UN_OPT
0.911**
UN_OPT x SCA
1.981†
UN_OPT x SOX
-0.967*
GRNT_OPT
0.928
GRNT_OPT x SCA -1.203
GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.379
EX_OPT
0.331
EX_OPT x SCA
-0.614
EX_OPT x SOX
0.086
OWNER
0.100**
OWNER x SCA
0.005
OWNER x SOX
-0.057
LIQ
-0.024**

DA < 0
-0.065**
0.003
-0.003*
-0.000
0.000
-0.020
0.000
0.041**
0.012
0.163
0.018
-0.363
-0.588
0.571
-1.096**
1.456
0.881†
-0.156
-0.055
0.447
-0.033
0.189*
0.112
0.044**

Table 5
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued
Note: t-statistics are computed by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test
Panel D of Table 5 reports the OLS regression results of the robustness test of H2 that adopts the Jones model proposed in Jones (1991)
to estimate discretionary accruals.
Variable Definitions:
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the Jones model proposed in Jones (1991). Appendix
1 provides the details.
DDA = an indicator variable that equals one if DA > 0, and zero if otherwise
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimates of bid-ask spread proposed in Corwin and Schultz
(2012) computed over a period of 252 trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2
provides the details.
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8, and zero if otherwise.
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year t.
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t.
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and 1992.
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 2001.
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than or equal to 2002, and zero if
otherwise.
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 provides the details.
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the CEO and CFO of
the firm in fiscal year t.
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total
outstanding shares of the firm.
UN_OPT = the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in fiscal year t) that CEO and CFO
held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
GRNT_OPT = the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares.
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the aggregate number of shares held by
CEO and CFO at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
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Table 5
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued
Panel E: Adopt the Industry Classification Scheme Proposed in Fama and French (1997) to Estimate Discretionary Accruals
Variables
Coeff.
Variables
Coeff.
DA > 0
DA < 0
Intercept
-0.063** DDA
0.140** Intercept
0.077** -0.063**
BIG
0.000
DDA x BIG
-0.010
BIG
-0.009*
0.000
ΔGDP
-0.001
DDA x ΔGDP
0.005** ΔGDP
0.003** -0.001
LMV
0.000
DDA x LMV
0.001
LMV
0.001
0.000
Time
0.000
DDA x Time
0.001
Time
0.002** 0.000
SCA
-0.010† DDA x SCA
0.011
SCA
0.001
-0.010†
SOX
0.000
DDA x SOX
-0.022* SOX
-0.021** 0.000
RM
0.030** DDA x RM
-0.028** RM
0.002
0.030**
BONUS
0.018
DDA x BONUS
-0.010
BONUS
0.008
0.018
BONUS x SCA
0.097† DDA x BONUS x SCA
-0.115
BONUS x SCA
-0.018
0.097†
BONUS x SOX
0.008
DDA x BONUS x SOX
0.008
BONUS x SOX
0.016
0.008
UN_OPT
-0.377
DDA x UN_OPT
1.386* UN_OPT
1.009** -0.377
UN_OPT x SCA
-1.185
DDA x UN_OPT x SCA
2.134
UN_OPT x SCA
0.948* -1.185
UN_OPT x SOX
0.493
DDA x UN_OPT x SOX
-1.639* UN_OPT x SOX
-1.146** 0.493
GRNT_OPT
-1.017* DDA x GRNT_OPT
1.886* GRNT_OPT
0.868
-1.017*
GRNT_OPT x SCA 1.436* DDA x GRNT_OPT x SCA -2.836** GRNT_OPT x SCA -1.400*
1.436*
GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.211
DDA x GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.126
GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.337
0.211
EX_OPT
-0.059
DDA x EX_OPT
0.241
EX_OPT
0.182
-0.059
EX_OPT x SCA
0.155
DDA x EX_OPT x SCA
-0.407
EX_OPT x SCA
-0.252
0.155
EX_OPT x SOX
0.208
DDA x EX_OPT x SOX
-0.404
EX_OPT x SOX
-0.196
0.208
OWNER
0.010
DDA x OWNER
0.096
OWNER
0.106** 0.010
OWNER x SCA
0.140** DDA x OWNER x SCA
-0.172* OWNER x SCA
-0.032
0.140**
OWNER x SOX
0.072
DDA x OWNER x SOX
-0.119
OWNER x SOX
-0.047
0.072
LIQ
0.044** DDA x LIQ
-0.072** LIQ
-0.028** 0.044**
N
20065
R2
0.416
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Table 5
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued
Note: t-statistics are computed by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test
Panel E of Table 5 reports the OLS regression results of the robustness test of H2 that applies the industry classification scheme
proposed in Fama and French (1997) to estimate discretionary accruals.
Variable Definitions:
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones model proposed in Dechow et al. (1995).
Appendix 1 provides the details.
DDA = an indicator variable that equals one if DA > 0, and zero if otherwise
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimates of bid-ask spread proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012)
computed over a period of 252 trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 provides the
details.
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8, and zero if otherwise.
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year t.
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t.
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and 1992.
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 2001.
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than or equal to 2002, and zero if
otherwise.
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 provides the details.
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the CEO and CFO of the firm
in fiscal year t.
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total
outstanding shares of the firm.
UN_OPT = the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in fiscal year t) that CEO and CFO held at
the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
GRNT_OPT = the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares.
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the aggregate number of shares held by CEO
and CFO at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
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Table 5
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued
Panel F: Adopt the Liquidity Measure Proposed in Amihud (2002)
Variables
Intercept
BIG
ΔGDP
LMV
Time
SCA
SOX
RM
BONUS
BONUS x SCA
BONUS x SOX
UN_OPT
UN_OPT x SCA
UN_OPT x SOX
GRNT_OPT
GRNT_OPT x SCA
GRNT_OPT x SOX
EX_OPT
EX_OPT x SCA
EX_OPT x SOX
OWNER
OWNER x SCA
OWNER x SOX
LIQ

Coeff.
-0.071**
0.003
0.001**
0.013**
0.000
-0.019**
0.010*
0.036**
0.044**
0.090*
-0.013
-0.805†
-1.245
0.819
-1.013†
1.481
-0.176
-0.163
0.405
0.533
-0.024
0.168**
0.096*
0.005**

Variables
DDA
DDA x BIG
DDA x ΔGDP
DDA x LMV
DDA x Time
DDA x SCA
DDA x SOX
DDA x RM
DDA x BONUS
DDA x BONUS x SCA
DDA x BONUS x SOX
DDA x UN_OPT
DDA x UN_OPT x SCA
DDA x UN_OPT x SOX
DDA x GRNT_OPT
DDA x GRNT_OPT x SCA
DDA x GRNT_OPT x SOX
DDA x EX_OPT
DDA x EX_OPT x SCA
DDA x EX_OPT x SOX
DDA x OWNER
DDA x OWNER x SCA
DDA x OWNER x SOX
DDA x LIQ
N
R2

Coeff.
0.145**
-0.012†
0.001
-0.019**
0.002**
0.029**
-0.034**
-0.036**
-0.038**
-0.110**
0.032†
1.973**
2.073
-2.330**
2.147**
-2.802†
0.562
0.369
-0.922†
-0.711*
0.163**
-0.239**
-0.194**
-0.007**
20064
0.390
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DA > 0
Intercept
0.074**
BIG
-0.009†
ΔGDP
0.002**
LMV
-0.006**
Time
0.002**
SCA
0.010**
SOX
-0.024**
RM
-0.000
BONUS
0.006
BONUS x SCA
-0.020
BONUS x SOX
0.019†
UN_OPT
1.168**
UN_OPT x SCA
0.828
UN_OPT x SOX
-1.511**
GRNT_OPT
1.134**
GRNT_OPT x SCA -1.321
GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.387
EX_OPT
0.206
EX_OPT x SCA
-0.517
EX_OPT x SOX
-0.178
OWNER
0.139**
OWNER x SCA
-0.070
OWNER x SOX
-0.098**
LIQ
-0.002†

DA < 0
-0.071**
0.003
0.001**
0.013**
0.000
-0.019**
0.010*
0.036**
0.044**
0.090*
-0.013
-0.805†
-1.245
0.819
-1.013†
1.481
-0.176
-0.163
0.405
0.533
-0.024
0.168**
0.096*
0.005**

Table 5
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued
Note: t-statistics are computed by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test

Panel F of Table 5 reports the OLS regression results of the robustness test of H2 that adopts the liquidity measure proposed in
Amihud (2002).
Variable Definitions:
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones model proposed in Dechow et al. (1995).
Appendix 1 provides the details.
DDA = an indicator variable that equals one if DA > 0, and zero if otherwise
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the illiquidity measure proposed in Amihud (2002) computed over a period of
252 trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 provides the details.
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8, and zero if otherwise.
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year t.
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t.
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and 1992.
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 2001.
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than or equal to 2002, and zero if
otherwise.
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 provides the details.
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the CEO and CFO of the firm
in fiscal year t.
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total
outstanding shares of the firm.
UN_OPT = the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in fiscal year t) that CEO and CFO held at
the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
GRNT_OPT = the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares.
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the aggregate number of shares held by CEO
and CFO at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
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Table 5
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued
Panel G: Adopt the Liquidity Measure Proposed in Hasbrouck (2009)
Variables
Intercept
BIG
ΔGDP
LMV
Time
SCA
SOX
RM
BONUS
BONUS x SCA
BONUS x SOX
UN_OPT
UN_OPT x SCA
UN_OPT x SOX
GRNT_OPT
GRNT_OPT x SCA
GRNT_OPT x SOX
EX_OPT
EX_OPT x SCA
EX_OPT x SOX
OWNER
OWNER x SCA
OWNER x SOX
LIQ

Coeff.
-0.065**
0.002
0.000
0.003†
-0.000
-0.013†
0.000
0.033**
0.037*
0.091
-0.002
-0.719
-1.260
0.824
-0.957
1.439†
0.080
-0.179
0.315
0.451
-0.009
0.158**
0.088†
0.025**

Variables
DDA
DDA x BIG
DDA x ΔGDP
DDA x LMV
DDA x Time
DDA x SCA
DDA x SOX
DDA x RM
DDA x BONUS
DDA x BONUS x SCA
DDA x BONUS x SOX
DDA x UN_OPT
DDA x UN_OPT x SCA
DDA x UN_OPT x SOX
DDA x GRNT_OPT
DDA x GRNT_OPT x SCA
DDA x GRNT_OPT x SOX
DDA x EX_OPT
DDA x EX_OPT x SCA
DDA x EX_OPT x SOX
DDA x OWNER
DDA x OWNER x SCA
DDA x OWNER x SOX
DDA x LIQ
N
R2

Coeff.
0.134**
-0.007
0.003†
-0.003†
0.003**
0.019
-0.019†
-0.031**
-0.029
-0.109
0.018
1.859*
2.119
-2.228**
2.031†
-2.621*
0.021
0.370
-0.801
-0.554
0.144*
-0.213**
-0.178*
-0.041**
19969
0.401

58

DA > 0
Intercept
0.069**
BIG
-0.005
ΔGDP
0.003**
LMV
-0.001
Time
0.002**
SCA
0.006
SOX
-0.019**
RM
0.002
BONUS
0.007
BONUS x SCA
-0.018
BONUS x SOX
0.017†
UN_OPT
1.140**
UN_OPT x SCA
0.859
UN_OPT x SOX
-1.404**
GRNT_OPT
1.074†
GRNT_OPT x SCA -1.182†
GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.100
EX_OPT
0.191
EX_OPT x SCA
-0.487
EX_OPT x SOX
-0.103
OWNER
0.134**
OWNER x SCA
-0.055*
OWNER x SOX
-0.090*
LIQ
-0.016**

DA < 0
-0.065**
0.002
0.000
0.003†
-0.000
-0.013†
0.000
0.033**
0.037*
0.091
-0.002
-0.719
-1.260
0.824
-0.957
1.439†
0.080
-0.179
0.315
0.451
-0.009
0.158**
0.088†
0.025**

Table 5
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued
Note: t-statistics are computed by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test
Panel G of Table 5 reports the OLS regression results of the robustness test of H2 that adopts the
liquidity measure proposed in Hasbrouck (2009).
Variable Definitions:
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones model
proposed in Dechow et al. (1995). Appendix 1 provides the details.
DDA = an indicator variable that equals one if DA > 0, and zero if otherwise
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the effective trading cost measure proposed in
Hasbrouck (2009) computed over a period of 252 trading days that ends in the
last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 provides the details.
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8,
and zero if otherwise.
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year t.
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t.
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and
1992.
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 2001.
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than or
equal to 2002, and zero if otherwise.
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 provides the
details.
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received
by the CEO and CFO of the firm in fiscal year t.
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end of
fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
UN_OPT = the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in fiscal
year t) that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total
outstanding shares of the firm.
GRNT_OPT = the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled
by total outstanding shares.
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the
aggregate number of shares held by CEO and CFO at the end of fiscal year t
scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.

To mitigate concerns with the possibility that our empirical finding about H2 is
confounded by endogeneity problems, we incorporate firm / year / industry fixed effects and a
long list of additional variables including governance-related variables identified from existing
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literature into equation (4)7. In general, endogeneity problems are driven by omitted correlated
variables (Larcker and Rusticus 2010). Firm fixed effects control for unobservable time-invariant
sources of firm heterogeneity. That is, the fixed-effects method solves the joint determination
problem wherein an unobservable time-invariant variable simultaneously determines both stock
liquidity and discretionary accruals. Industry fixed effects control for industry varying effects on
stock liquidity and discretionary accruals. We identify a long list of additional control variables
by referring to prior studies (i.e. Badertscher 2011; Bebchuk et al. 2009; Bhagat and Bolton 2008;
Chung et al. 2010; Cohen et al. 2008; Zang Forthcoming). 8 Prior studies suggest that these
variables are either arguably related to or simply associated with AEM and/or stock liquidity. We
provide the details including definitions, theoretical and empirical justification, and references in
Appendix 3.
The finding of Chung et al. (2010) suggests that corporate governance setup may be
important omitted correlated “variables” because good corporate governance setup arguably
constrains managers from engaging accruals-based earnings management and at the same time
contributes to stock liquidity. Therefore, in our causality analysis, we need to control for
variations in corporate governance. Because of the multi-dimension and context-contingency
7

Though not perfect, our approach to dealing with endogeneity problem is pragmatically
recommended (see Larcker and Rusticus 2010). Use of instrumental variable(s) is the other
econometrically sound approach to dealing with endogeneity problems. However, it is difficult
to find an instrument variable that satisfies required econometrical conditions. Moreover,
simulation results suggest that estimates based on instrument variables that only slightly violate
required econometrical conditions may be “more biased and more likely to provide the wrong
statistical inference” than those estimates that make no correction for endogeneity (see Larcker
and Rusticus 2010).
8
Badertscher (2011) finds that use of accruals to manage earnings is affected by the degree of
overvaluation. Badertscher (2011) measures the degree of overvaluation by the difference
between market value and “fundamental” value derived from residual income model. In our
study, we measure the degree of overvaluation by the cumulative stock returns of past three years.
It is arguably sensible to presume that firms with high cumulative stock returns in the past are
more likely to be overvalued.
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nature of different corporate governance mechanisms (see Larcker et al. 2007), we refer to prior
studies (i.e., Bechuk et al. 2009; Bhagat and Bolton 2008; Chung et al. 2010) to identify the most
“relevant” corporate governance mechanisms. Specifically, we include governance measures
related to CEO-Chair duality, director stock ownership, board size, board independence, audit
committee independence, and entrenchment index developed in Bebchuk et al. (2009) in our
causality test.
To mitigate concerns with potential reverse causality, we measure stock liquidity as the
natural logarithm of the inverse of high-low estimates of bid-ask spreads calculated over a period
of 252 trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. The findings of Zang (2012)
suggest that major decisions on AEM are generally made after fiscal year end. Therefore, there is
generally a time lag between our measure of stock liquidity and firms’ decisions on AEM. We
argue that in the presence of such a time lag, evidence supporting H2 cannot be simply attributed
to reverse causality. In addition, we include the absolute value of discretionary accruals of fiscal
year t-1 in the extended version of equation (4). If there were a reverse causality between stock
liquidity and AEM, inclusion of the absolute value of discretionary accruals of fiscal year t-1 will
further ensure that evidence supporting H2 cannot be simply attributed to reverse causality.
Table 6 reports the OLS estimates of the extended version of equation (4). The finding
generally supports H2. That is, there exists a negative relationship between stock liquidity and
discretionary accruals when discretionary accruals are income-increasing and a positive
relationship when discretionary accruals are income-decreasing. Surprisingly, the regression
coefficient on LIQ is not statistically significant when DA < 0 even though the sign of the
coefficient is consistent with the prediction of H2. We conjecture that the finding about the
relationship between liquidity and DA when DA < 0 may be driven by certain features unique to
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the limited sample used in the test as a result of requirement of availability of a long list of
control variables.

In summary, H2 empirically holds after controlling for firm industry fixed effects and a
comprehensive list of covariates and taking into account potential reverse causality. Therefore,
we argue that endogeneity issues and reverse causality may not drive our finding about H2.
5.5 Additional Analysis: Trends of Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals
Prior studies show that stock liquidity varies over time (e.g. Chordia et al. 2008). Given
the strong cross-sectional evidence about the relationship between stock liquidity and AEM, we
argue that it is interesting to examine whether AEM co-varies with overall stock liquidity over
time. We draw Figure 4 to examine whether the time-series pattern of co-variation between stock
liquidity and AEM is in line with H2. To draw Figure 4, we separate observations with negative
discretionary accruals from those with positive discretionary accrual. H2 indicates that stock
liquidity and discretionary accruals positively co-vary when DA < 0 and negatively co-vary
when DA > 0.
Figure 4 reveals several interesting patterns. First, consistent with Cohen et al. (2008)
Figure 4 reveals that there is an overall trend of increase in AEM during the period of 1989-2000
and that there is an overall trend of decrease in AEM during the period of 2002-2005. Second,
Figure 4 shows that starting from 1997 stock liquidity and discretionary accruals co-vary closely
as implied by H2, especially when DA < 0.
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Table 6
Causality Test: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals
Variables
Intercept
BIG
ΔGDP
LMV
Time
SCA
SOX
BONUS
BONUS x SCA
BONUS x SOX
UN_OPT
UN_OPT x SCA
UN_OPT x SOX
GRNT_OPT
GRNT_OPT x SCA
GRNT_OPT x SOX
EX_OPT
EX_OPT x SCA
EX_OPT x SOX
OWNER
OWNER x SCA
OWNER x SOX
AT
AT2
D_NOA
OC
PRM
RRM

Coeff.
0.000
-0.042**
0.000
-0.001
-0.001
0.008†
0.015**
-0.034
0.001
0.020
-1.521
1.949
1.585
-0.938
-0.205
0.033
0.462
-0.744
-0.166
-0.082
0.053
0.103
0.000**
-0.000
0.002
-0.000†
0.221**
-0.075**

Variables
DDA
DDA x BIG
DDA x ΔGDP
DDA x LMV
DDA x Time
DDA x SCA
DDA x SOX
DDA x BONUS
DDA x BONUS x SCA
DDA x BONUS x SOX
DDA x UN_OPT
DDA x UN_OPT x SCA
DDA x UN_OPT x SOX
DDA x GRNT_OPT
DDA x GRNT_OPT x SCA
DDA x GRNT_OPT x SOX
DDA x EX_OPT
DDA x EX_OPT x SCA
DDA x EX_OPT x SOX
DDA x OWNER
DDA x OWNER x SCA
DDA x OWNER x SOX
DDA x AT
DDA x AT2
DDA x D_NOA
DDA x OC
DDA x PRM
DDA x RRM

Coeff.
0.071**
0.009
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.011†
-0.008
0.018
-0.010
-0.003
2.799
-0.229
-4.191*
1.865
-3.123
-1.031
-0.773
0.742
0.270
0.135
-0.034
-0.171†
-0.000
-0.000
-0.001
-0.000
0.015
0.004
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Variables
Intercept
BIG
ΔGDP
LMV
Time
SCA
SOX
BONUS
BONUS x SCA
BONUS x SOX
UN_OPT
UN_OPT x SCA
UN_OPT x SOX
GRNT_OPT
GRNT_OPT x SCA
GRNT_OPT x SOX
EX_OPT
EX_OPT x SCA
EX_OPT x SOX
OWNER
OWNER x SCA
OWNER x SOX
AT
AT2
D_NOA
OC
PRM
RRM

DA > 0
0.072**
-0.033**
0.001*
0.001
-0.000
0.019**
0.008
-0.017
-0.009
0.017
1.278*
1.721
-2.606**
0.927
-3.328*
-0.999
-0.312
-0.002
0.104
0.053
0.019
-0.068
0.000**
-0.000*
0.002
-0.000*
0.236**
-0.071**

DA < 0
0.000
-0.042**
0.000
-0.001
-0.001
0.008†
0.015**
-0.034
0.001
0.020
-1.521
1.949
1.585
-0.938
-0.205
0.033
0.462
-0.744
-0.166
-0.082
0.053
0.103
0.000**
-0.000
0.002
-0.000†
0.221**
-0.075**

Table 6
Causality Test: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals – Continued
MS
ZS
MTB
IO
ROA
MB
CC
DO
DS
DI
AI
EI
HI
LCOV
LIT
SEO
MBE
D_RET1
D_RET2
D_RET3
D_RET4
LEV
IC
LCSHO
ADA_P1
LIQ

0.015†
-0.001*
-0.009
-0.042**
0.568**
-0.011**
0.003
-0.328
0.001
0.007
-0.015
0.001
0.047
-0.009**
0.007
0.006
-0.018**
-0.003
-0.002
-0.006
-0.015**
0.052**
0.001
0.001
0.025
0.002

DDA x MS
DDA x ZS
DDA x MTB
DDA x IO
DDA x ROA
DDA x MB
DDA x CC
DDA x DO
DDA x DS
DDA x DI
DDA x AI
DDA x EI
DDA x HI
DDA x LCOV
DDA x LIT
DDA x SEO
DDA x MBE
DDA x D_RET1
DDA x D_RET2
DDA x D_RET3
DDA x D_RET4
DDA x LEV
DDA x IC
DDA x LCSHO
DDA x ADA_P1
DDA x LIQ
Industry Fixed Effects
Firm Fixed Effects
N
R2

-0.005
0.001
-0.034
0.015
-0.229**
0.003
-0.004
0.211
-0.002*
-0.014
0.020†
-0.000
-0.024
0.007*
-0.002
-0.010†
0.010†
0.003
0.006
0.005
0.016*
-0.033*
-0.017
-0.005
0.061†
-0.017**
YES
YES
5702

MS
ZS
MTB
IO
ROA
MB
CC
DO
DS
DI
AI
EI
HI
LCOV
LIT
SEO
MBE
D_RET1
D_RET2
D_RET3
D_RET4
LEV
IC
LCSHO
ADA_P1
LIQ
Industry Fixed Effects
Firm Fixed Effects

0.789
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0.010
0.015†
-0.000
-0.001*
-0.043* -0.009
-0.027* -0.042**
0.339** 0.568**
-0.008** -0.011**
-0.000
0.003
-0.117
-0.328
-0.001
0.001
-0.006
0.007
0.005
-0.015
0.000
0.001
0.023
0.047
-0.002
-0.009**
0.005
0.007
-0.005
0.006
-0.009** -0.018**
0.000
-0.003
0.003
-0.002
-0.000
-0.006
0.001
-0.015**
0.019
0.052**
-0.016
0.001
-0.004
0.001
0.087** 0.025
-0.015** 0.002
YES
YES

Table 6
Causality Test: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals – Continued
Note: t-statistics are computed by using cluster-robust standard errors
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test
Table ? reports the OLS regression results of the causality test of H2 that includes firm and
industry fixed effects, the absolute value of discretionary accruals of prior fiscal year, and a
comprehensive list of control variables identified from the literature.
Variable Definitions:
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones model
proposed in Dechow et al. (1995). Appendix 1 provides the details.
DDA = an indicator variable that equals one if DA > 0, and zero if otherwise.
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimates of bid-ask spread
proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) computed over a period of 252 trading
days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 provides the details.
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8, and
zero if otherwise.
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year t.
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t.
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and
1992.
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 2001.
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than or
equal to 2002, and zero if otherwise.
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received
by the CEO and CFO of the firm in fiscal year t.
UN_OPT = the average number of un-exercisable options (excluding options grants in fiscal
year t) that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total
outstanding shares of the firm.
GRNT_OP = the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled by
T
total outstanding shares.
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end of
fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
OWNER = the average stock ownership of CEO and CFO where stock ownership is the ratio
of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the aggregate number of
shares held by CEO and CFO at the end of fiscal year t to total outstanding
shares of the firm.
AT = the number of years that the auditor has audited the firm.
AT2 = the square of AT.
D_NOA = an indicator variable that equals one if the net operating assets (i.e., shareholders’
equity less cash and marketable securities plus total debt) at the beginning of
fiscal year t divided by lagged sales is greater than the median of the
corresponding industry-year, and zero if otherwise.
OC = days receivable plus days inventory minus days payable at the beginning of
fiscal year t.
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Table 6
Causality Test: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals – Continued
PRM = the predicted component of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix
3 provides the details.
RRM = the unexpected component of real activities-based earnings management.
Appendix 3 provides the details.
MS = the ratio of the firm’s sales to the total sales of its industry at the beginning of
fiscal year t, where industry is defined on the basis of 3-digit SIC codes.
ZS = z-score at the beginning of fiscal year t, where z-score is

MTB =
IO =
ROA =
MB =
CC =
DO
DS
DI
AI

=
=
=
=

EI =
HI =
LCOV =
LIT =

SEO =
MBE =
D_RETj =

.
the marginal tax rate, defined and provided by Professor John Graham.
the percentage of institutional ownership in the calendar quarter that is closest to
the end of fiscal year t.
the return on assets, computed using net income for the rolling four quarters that
ends in the third quarter of fiscal year t.
The ratio of market value of equity to the book value of equity.
an indicator variable that equals one if CEO is the chairman of the board of
directors, and zero if otherwise.
the average stock ownership of board of directors.
the number of directors serving in the board of directors.
the percentage of independent directors in the board of directors.
the percentage of independent directors in the audit committee of the board of
directors.
the entrenchment index developed in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) that is
based on six provisions. Appendix 2 provides the details.
Herfindahl index, the sum of squares of the ratio of each firm’s sales to total sales
in the same industry defined by three-digit SIC codes in year t-1.
the natural log of one plus the number of analysts following the firm in the three
months prior to the earnings announcement.
an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is in a high litigation risk industry
including biotechnology, computers, electronics, and retail. Appendix 3 provides
the details.
an indicator variable that equals one if the firm ever sells stocks in the next three
fiscal years and equals zero if otherwise.
the percentage of times of meeting/beating analysts’ forecast consensus in the past
eight quarters.
a dummy variable that indicates the membership of a firm-year observation in five
equal groups generated according to the magnitude of cumulative stock returns
over past three years where the group with lowest cumulative stock returns serves
as the benchmark, j=1,2,3,4.
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Table 6
Causality Test: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals – Continued
LEV = the ratio of total debt to total assets.
IC = the inverse of interest coverage ratio computed as the interest expense in fiscal year t
divided by operating income before depreciation in fiscal year t-1.
LCSHO = the natural log of total outstanding shares.
ADA_P1 = the absolute value of discretionary accruals of fiscal year t-1.

However, during the period of 1989-1996 the pattern of co-variation between stock
liquidity and discretionary accruals is not consistent with the prediction of H2. We notice that
during the period of 1989-1996 the overall stock liquidity is low. During the period of 1989-1996
the tick size is $1/8 while tick size in late periods of my study is either $1/8 or $1/100. Tick size
is found to be negatively related to stock market liquidity (Chordia et al. 2008). We conjecture
that the relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals may be empirically
nonlinear rather than linear as presumed in our H2. Therefore, the nonlinear relationship between
stock liquidity and discretionary accruals may account for the finding that the co-variation
between liquidity and discretionary accruals is not consistent with the prediction of H2 during
the period of 1989-1996 when stock liquidity is low.
To examine whether the relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals is
empirically nonlinear, we first sort all firm-year observations into five equal groups according to
the magnitude of stock liquidity and then generate four dummy variables to indicate the
membership of each firm-year observation. Table 7 reports the OLS estimates of the modified
version of equation (4) that uses the four dummy variables as measure of liquidity rather than the
original liquidity measure. The results reported in Table 7 confirm our conjecture about the
nonlinearity of the relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals. We argue that
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the nonlinearity of the relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals may
account for why the pattern of co-variation between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals is
not consistent with the prediction of H2 during the period of 1989-2001 when stock liquidity is
low.
Cohen et al. (2008) attribute the decline in AEM during the period of 2002-2005 to the
passage of SOX and other concurrent events such as high visibility of enforcement actions
against offending corporate officers. However, we find it difficult to apply Cohen et al.’s (2008)
argument to account for the close co-variation between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals.
In other words, Cohen et al.’s (2008) argument may be used to justify the overall decline in
AEM after 2002 but could not explain the overtime variation in AEM before and after 2002. Our
finding about H2 provides an additional if not alternative explanation for overtime variation in
AEM: that is, the overtime variation in stock liquidity and ensuing price efficiency may drive the
overtime variation in AEM. Our finding about H2 suggests that during the period of 2002-2005
improvement in stock liquidity and ensuing price efficiency may drive the overall decline in
AEM9.

9

In 1997 the tick size of stock markets is reduced from $1/8 to $1/16; in 2001 the tick size of
stock markets is reduced from $1/16 to $1/100. All these reductions in tick size are found to
contribute to improvement in overall stock market liquidity (Chordia et al. 2008).
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Panel A: DA > 0

Panel B: DA < 0

Figure 4
Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals: Time-Series Evidence

Figure 4 depicts the over-time co-variation between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals.
To draw Figure 4, each year we sort all observations into two groups according to the sign of
their discretionary accruals and compute the means of stock liquidity and discretionary accruals
separately.
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Table 7
Additional Test: the Nonlinearity of the Relationship between Stock Liquidity and Discretionary
Accruals
Variables
Intercept
BIG
ΔGDP
LMV
Time
SCA
SOX
RM
BONUS
BONUS x SCA
BONUS x SOX
UN_OPT
UN_OPT x SCA
UN_OPT x SOX
GRNT_OPT
GRNT_OPT x SCA
GRNT_OPT x SOX
EX_OPT
EX_OPT x SCA
EX_OPT x SOX
OWNER
OWNER x SCA
OWNER x SOX
D1_LIQ
D2_LIQ
D3_LIQ
D4_LIQ

Coeff.
-0.105**
0.001
-0.001†
0.001
0.000
-0.009
0.003
0.032**
0.029*
0.083
-0.002
-0.610
-1.091
0.719
-0.739
1.223
-0.097
-0.198
0.323
0.439
0.010
0.162**
0.078
0.032**
0.046**
0.055**
0.061**

Variables
DDA
DDA x BIG
DDA x ΔGDP
DDA x LMV
DDA x Time
DDA x SCA
DDA x SOX
DDA x RM
DDA x BONUS
DDA x BONUS x SCA
DDA x BONUS x SOX
DDA x UN_OPT
DDA x UN_OPT x SCA
DDA x UN_OPT x SOX
DDA x GRNT_OPT
DDA x GRNT_OPT x SCA
DDA x GRNT_OPT x SOX
DDA x EX_OPT
DDA x EX_OPT x SCA
DDA x EX_OPT x SOX
DDA x OWNER
DDA x OWNER x SCA
DDA x OWNER x SOX
DDA x D1_LIQ
DDA x D2_LIQ
DDA x D3_LIQ
DDA x D4_LIQ
N
R2

Coeff.
0.194**
-0.008
0.005**
-0.001
0.001
0.015
-0.021†
-0.030**
-0.018
-0.102
0.017
1.660*
2.151
-2.165**
1.672
-2.457*
0.456
0.367
-0.749
-0.523
0.107†
-0.198**
-0.160*
-0.042**
-0.067**
-0.082**
-0.097**
20065

DA > 0
Intercept
0.089**
BIG
-0.006
ΔGDP
0.004**
LMV
-0.000
Time
0.002**
SCA
0.006
SOX
-0.018**
RM
0.002
BONUS
0.011*
BONUS x SCA
-0.019
BONUS x SOX
0.015
UN_OPT
1.049**
UN_OPT x SCA
1.060
UN_OPT x SOX
-1.446**
GRNT_OPT
0.933
GRNT_OPT x SCA -1.234†
GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.359
EX_OPT
0.169
EX_OPT x SCA
-0.426†
EX_OPT x SOX
-0.084
OWNER
0.118**
OWNER x SCA
-0.035
OWNER x SOX
-0.082*
D1_LIQ
-0.010
D2_LIQ
-0.021**
D3_LIQ
-0.027**
D4_LIQ
-0.036**

DA < 0
-0.105**
0.001
-0.001†
0.001
0.000
-0.009
0.003
0.032**
0.029*
0.083
-0.002
-0.610
-1.091
0.719
-0.739
1.223
-0.097
-0.198
0.323
0.439
0.010
0.162**
0.078
0.032**
0.046**
0.055**
0.061**

0.410

Note: t-statistics are computed by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test
Table 7 reports the OLS regression results of the additional test that examines the nonlinearity of
the relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals.
Variable Definitions:
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones model
proposed in Dechow et al. (1995). Appendix 1 provides the details.
DDA = an indicator variable that equals one if DA > 0, and zero if otherwise.
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Dx_LIQ = a dummy variable that indicates the membership of a firm-year observation in
five equal group generated according to the magnitude of stock liquidity (LIQ)
with the group with lowest stock liquidity serving as the benchmark group,
where LIQ is the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimates of bid-ask
spread proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) computed over a period of 252
trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 provides the
details. x = 1, 2, 3, 4.
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8, and
zero if otherwise.
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year t.
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t.
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and
1992.
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 2001.
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than or
equal to 2002, and zero if otherwise.
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 provides the
details.
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received
by the CEO and CFO of the firm in fiscal year t.
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end of
fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
UN_OPT = the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in fiscal
year t) that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total
outstanding shares of the firm.
GRNT_ = the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled
OPT
by total outstanding shares.
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the
aggregate number of shares held by CEO and CFO at the end of fiscal year t
scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.
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6. CONCLUSION
Our study examines the effect of stock liquidity on the ability of stock prices to convey
information about future earnings and accruals-based earnings management. In line with microlevel evidence that stock liquidity improves price efficiency, we find that as stock liquidity
increases the ability of stock prices to reflect future earnings increases as measured by future
earnings response coefficients. Moreover, we find that stock prices convey information about
future earnings only when stock liquidity is above certain threshold. Our finding about the effect
of stock liquidity on stock price informativeness regarding future earnings is robust to adoption
of different model specifications and use of different stock liquidity measures. Our finding about
the relationship between stock liquidity and price informativeness as measured by future
earnings response coefficients provides macro-level evidence about the effect of stock liquidity
on price efficiency.
We argue that stock liquidity and ensuing stock price efficiency dampen certain motives
for firms and their managers to manage earnings will be dampened. Specifically, we argue that
as stock liquidity increases and thus stock prices become more informative about firms’
economic fundamentals, managers will find it more difficult and thus less beneficial to
manipulate investors’ perceptions of firms’ economic fundamentals through AEM. Moreover,
both theories and empirical evidence suggest that as stock liquidity increases and consequently
stock prices become more efficient (i) the sensitivity of managers’ pay to stock prices increase
(Holmstrom and Tirole 1993; Jayaraman and Milbourn Forthcoming) and (ii) firms and their
directors assign greater weight to stock price performance in their decisions about annual
compensation for CEOs and top-paid executives (Banker and Datar 1989; David et al. 2011).
Therefore, we argue that given two additional regularities: managerial attention and cognition are
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strategically scarce and stock prices become more responsive to managers’ value creation efforts
in a less biases manner as stock liquidity increases we can see that managers should rationally
engage in less earnings management and allocate more efforts to value creation as stock liquidity
increases and stock prices become more efficient. Furthermore, we argue that stock liquidity and
ensuing price efficiency also reduce the demand for communication of managers’ private
information through earnings management. In conclusion, we hypothesize that as stock liquidity
increases firms engage in less AEM.
Our finding confirms our hypothesized dampening effect of stock liquidity on AEM. Our
finding about the dampening effect of stock liquidity and ensuing price efficiency on AEM is
robust to chosen regression models of normal accruals, the industry classification schemes
adopted to estimate normal accruals, and the use of different liquidity measures. Further analyses
suggest that endogeneity issues and potential reverse causality may not drive our finding about
H2.
Stock liquidity varies over time. Our cross-section finding about the effect of stock
liquidity on AEM suggests that over time variations in AEM may be driven by variations in
stock liquidity and thus variations in overall stock price efficiency. Our additional analysis shows
that when stock liquidity is not very low, AEM and stock liquidity closely co-vary over time as
implied in our H2. Our finding about the co-variation of stock liquidity and AEM provides a
market efficiency-based explanation of the decline in AEM during the period of 2002-2005 first
documented in Cohen et al. (2008), and thus has important implication.
In this study, we focus on the impact of stock liquidity on AEM. Actually, our argument
about the effect of stock liquidity on AEM also applies to real-activities manipulation (see
Edmans 2009). Real-activities manipulation generally involves sub-optimal real business
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decisions, and therefore may have long-lasting negative economic effects. We welcome research
that examines the impact of stock liquidity on real-activities manipulation.
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APPENDIX 1: MEASURES OF ACCRUALS-BASED AND REAL ACTIVITIES-BASED
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
We identify three regression models from the accounting literature (i.e., Jones 1991 (J);
Dechow et al. 1995 (DSS); Dechow et al. 2003 (DRT)) to estimate the normal levels of accruals.
We estimate each regression model cross-sectionally within each industry-year over the period of
1989 – 2010. The residuals from each regression model are our measure of accruals-based
earnings management. In our main test of H2, we use residuals obtained from the modified Jones
model proposed in Dechow et al. (1995). However, our findings about H2 still hold when we use
residuals obtained from the original Jones model proposed in Jones (1991) or from the modified
Jones model proposed in Dechow et al. (2003). We mainly define industry membership on the
basis of two-digit SIC codes while our findings about H2 still hold when we adopt the industry
classification scheme proposed in Fama and French (1997).

DSS (1995):
DRT (2003):
J (1991):
Variable definitions:
TACj,t =
total accruals calculated by using the cash-flow approach (i.e., ibc – (oancf –
xidoc), see Hribar and Collins (2002)) for fiscal year t.
ΔSj,t =
change in net sales (i.e., sale) from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t.
Aj,t-1 =
total assets (i.e., at) at the beginning of fiscal year t.
ΔRECj,t =
change in accounts receivable (i.e., rect) from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t.
PPENTj,t =
property, plan, and equipment (i.e., ppent) at the end of fiscal year t.
PPEGTj,t =
property, plan, and equipment (i.e., ppegt) at the end of fiscal year t.
k =
slope coefficient from a regression of ΔREC on ΔS (i.e., ΔRECi,t = a + kΔSi,t +
εi,t) estimated within each year-industry.
TACj,t-1 =
total accruals calculated by using the cash-flow approach (i.e., ibc – (oancf –
xidoc), see Hribar and Collins (2002)) for fiscal year t-1.
Aj,t-2 =
total assets (i.e., at) at the beginning of fiscal year t-1.
ΔSj,t+1 =
change in net sales (i.e., sale) from fiscal year t to fiscal year t+1.
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Sj,t =

net sales (i.e., sale) in fiscal year t.

We estimate each regression model for any industry-year with at least fifteen
observations. We report coefficients as the mean value of coefficients across industry-years. We
calculate t-statistics by using the standard error of the mean value of coefficients across industryyears. We report the adjusted R2 (number of observations) as the mean value of adjusted R2
(number of observations) across industry-years. Our results are comparable to those of prior
studies (e.g., Zang 2007, 2012).
Panel A: Estimation of Normal Level of Total Accruals
DSS
DRT
Coefficients
SIC2
FF
SIC2
FF
α0
-0.526** -0.372**
-0.347** -0.266**
β1
β2

0.027**

0.039**

-0.152** -0.170**

0.015**

0.025**

-0.122** -0.130**

β3

0.223**

0.237**

β4

0.029**

0.017**

J
SIC2
FF
-0.039** -0.037**
-0.430** -0.360**
0.031**

0.042**

-0.046** -0.057**

Adj. R2 (%)
37.95
34.52
45.79
42.68
28.90
28.48
# of obs.
122.54
152.29
105.84
128.43
123.38
152.74
# of industry-years
1084
881
945
789
1083
884
Panel B: Summary Statistics for Accruals-Based Earnings Management
Variables
Mean Std. Dev.
Q1
Median
Q3
DA - DSS - SIC2 -0.0204 0.2358 -0.0695 -0.0033 0.0574
DA - DSS - FF
-0.0203 0.2359 -0.0704 -0.0034 0.0585
DA - DRT - SIC2 -0.0124 0.1737 -0.0579 -0.0008 0.0510
DA - DRT - FF
-0.0121 0.1740 -0.0596 -0.0011 0.0520
DA - J - SIC2
0.0001 0.2977 -0.0488 0.0165 0.0808
DA - J - FF
0.0001 0.2965 -0.0500 0.0169 0.0814
Panel C: Pearson (Upper Triangle) and Spearman (Lower Triangle) Correlations
Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
DA - DSS - SIC2 (1)
0.97 0.90 0.88 0.91 0.88
DA - DSS - FF (2)
0.93
0.88 0.90 0.88 0.91
DA - DRT - SIC2 (3)
0.86 0.83
0.96 0.79 0.77
DA - DRT - FF (4)
0.83 0.87 0.92
0.77 0.79
DA - J - SIC2 (5)
0.86 0.81 0.78 0.75
0.96
DA - J - FF (6)
0.81 0.87 0.74 0.78 0.89

83

Following Zang (2012) we examine two types of real activities-based earnings
management: overproducing inventory to reduce the cost of goods sold and increase earnings,
and cutting discretionary expenditures (i.e., R&D, advertising, and selling, general and
administrative (SG&A) expenditures). In line with prior studies (e.g., Badertscher 2011; Cohen
et al. 2008; Zang Forthcoming), we follow the regression models proposed in Roychowdhury
(2006) to estimate the abnormal level of production costs associated with overproduction of
inventory, and the abnormal level of discretionary expenditures.

Variable definitions:
PRODj,t = the sum of the cost of goods sold (i.e., cogs) in fiscal year t and the change in
inventory (i.e., invt) from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t.
DISXj,t = the sum of R&D (i.e., xrd), advertising (i.e., xad), and SG&A (i.e., xsga)
expenditures.
Aj,t-1 = total assets (i.e., at) at the beginning of fiscal year t.
Sj,t = net sales (i.e., sale) in fiscal year t.
Sj,t-1 = net sales (i.e., sale) in fiscal year t-1.
ΔSj,t = change in net sales (i.e., sale) from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t.
ΔSj,t-1 = change in net sales (i.e., sale) from fiscal year t-2 to fiscal year t-1.
We estimate regression model (d) and (e) for any industry-year with at least fifteen
observations. We report coefficients as the mean value of coefficients across industry-years. We
calculate t-statistics by using the standard error of the mean value of coefficients across industryyears. We report the adjusted R2 (number of observations) as the mean value of adjusted R2
(number of observations) across industry-years. The residual from regression model (d) is the
estimated amount of inventory overproduction (denoted as RM_PROD). That is, higher residuals
indicate larger amount of inventory overproduction and greater earnings management through
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reducing the cost of goods sold. The residual from regression model (e) is the estimated
abnormal level of discretionary expenditures. We multiply the residuals from regression model
(e) by negative one (denoted as RM_DISX) so that higher residuals suggest greater reduction of
discretionary expenditures by firms to increase reported earnings. Consistent with prior studies
(e.g., Zang Forthcoming) we aggregate the two measures of real activities-based earnings
management into one proxy (i.e., RM = RM_PROD + RM_DISX). Our results are comparable to
those of prior studies (e.g., Zang Forthcoming).
Panel A: Estimation of Normal Level of Discretionary Expenditures and Production Costs
Coefficients

DISX

PROD
SIC2
FF
-0.088** -0.072**

α0

SIC2
FF
0.147** 0.187**

β1

1.451** 1.021**

0.009

β2

0.148** 0.135**

0.776** 0.741**

β3

-0.014

β4

0.276**
0.011

-0.029** -0.032**
2

Adj. R (%)
# of obs.
# of industry-years

43.26
118.23
1041

41.39
141.71
880

84.80
114.66
1063

81.49
143.91
856

Panel B: Summary Statistics for Real Activities-Based Earnings Management
Variables
Mean Std. Dev.
Q1
Median
Q3
RM - SIC2
-0.0190 0.5617 -0.1999 0.0369 0.2582
PROD - SIC2
-0.0401 0.3026 -0.1535 -0.0228 0.0888
DISX - SIC2
0.0211 0.3732 -0.0743 0.0525 0.1983
RM - FF
-0.0209 0.5500 -0.1975 0.0372 0.2427
PROD - FF
-0.0405 0.3006 -0.1521 -0.0242 0.0873
DISX - FF
0.0197 0.3655 -0.0737 0.0538 0.1859
Panel C: Pearson (Upper Triangle) and Spearman (Lower Triangle) Correlations
Variables
RM - SIC2 (1)
PROD - SIC2 (2)
DISX - SIC2 (3)
RM - FF (4)
PROD - FF (5)
DISX - FF (6)

(1)
0.80
0.87
0.89
0.71
0.76

(2)
0.79
0.47
0.71
0.89
0.41

(3)
0.87
0.37
0.77
0.43
0.88

(4)
0.92
0.72
0.81
0.80
0.86
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(5)
0.71
0.90
0.34
0.78
0.46

(6)
0.81
0.34
0.94
0.86
0.36

APPENDIX 2: STOCK LIQUIDITY MEASURES
In our study, we adopt three liquidity measures: the high-low measure of effective spread
(LIQ_HL) proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012), the Gibbs estimate of effective spread
(LIQ_G) proposed in Hasbrouck (2009), and the price impact estimate (LIQ_A) proposed in
Amihud (2002). All these three liquidity measures are computed from daily stock data provided
by CRSP, and exhibit desirable statistical properties with respect to liquidity measures computed
from intra-day transaction-level data (see Corwin and Schultz 2012; Goyenko et al. 2009;
Hasbrouck 2009). In our main test of H2, we adopt LIQ_HL while our findings regarding H2
still hold when using LIQ_G and LIQ_A as our stock liquidity measures.
Corwin and Schultz (2012) developed their high-low measure on the basis of simple
uncontroversial ideas. That is, daily high prices are always buyer-initiated while daily low prices
are always seller-initiated. Therefore, the ratio of high-to-low prices reflect both the fundamental
volatility of the stock and the stock’s bid-ask spread. Moreover, the component of the high-tolow price ratio attributed to fundamental volatility increase proportionately with the trading
interval while the component attributed to bid-ask spreads stay relatively constant over a short
period. In other words, the price range over a two-day period reflects two days’ volatility and one
bid-ask spread while the sum of the price ranges over two consecutive single days reflect two
days’ volatility and twice the spread. Based on these simple insights, Corwin and Schultz (2012)
first derived a function of the high-low price ratios on two consecutive single days and a function
of the high-low ratio from a single two-day period and then applied these two functions to solve
both the spread (S) and the variance (σ2).
Analytically Corwin and Schultz (2012) showed
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Empirically, we estimate β and γ from stock return data and then numerically solve
equation (a) to get

. After we get

we can refer to equation (b) to get α. Once we get α, we

can refer to equation (c) to get empirical bid-ask spread S. Furthermore, Corwin and Schultz
(2012) showed that under reasonable empirical conditions, we can get a closed-form solution for
α. In our study, we adopt the closed-form solution for α to compute the high-low measure of
effective spread. Readers can refer to Corwin and Schultz (2012) for the derivation and
estimation details. The closed-form solution for α is as follows:
√

√

√
√
√
Hasbrouck (2009) proposed his Gibbs sampler estimate of effective trading cost that is

based on daily closing prices. The Gibbs sampler estimate is built on Roll’s (1984) model of
security prices in a market with transaction costs. Roll (1984) modeled the price dynamics as
mt = mt-1 + ut
pt = mt + cqt
where mt is the log quote midpoint prevailing prior to the tth trade (i.e., efficient price), pt is the
log trade price, and the qt are direction indicators that equal +1 for a buy or -1 for a sale with

87

equal probability. ut reflects public information uncorrelated with qt. We can view c as the
effective cost because Roll’s model applies to transaction prices.
Roll’s model implies
Δpt = cΔqt + ut (e) and

√

where Cov(Δpt, Δpt-1) is the first-order auto-

covariance of price changes.
Hasbrouck’s Gibbs sampler estimate takes equation (e) as a linear regression and applies
the Gibbs sampler developed in the context of Bayesian statistics to simulate the coefficients of
the linear regression, the error covariance matrix, and the trade direction indicators. Interested
readers can refer to Hasbrouck (2009, 1448-1455) for the details. Empirically, Hasbrouck (2009)
extended Roll’s price dynamics model by including daily market return in equation (e).
Hasbrouck (2009) argued that inclusion of daily market return in equation (e) can sharpen the
allocation of transaction price changes between “true” (efficient price) returns and transient
trading costs.
In our robustness test of H2, we also adopt the price impact measure proposed in Amihud
(2002). Prior studies (e.g., Goyenko et al. 2009; Hasbrouck 2009) find that Amihud’s (2002)
measure exhibits desirable statistical attributes in relation to transaction-level measure of price
impacts. Amihud’s (2002) measure is defined as the average ratio of the daily absolute return to
the dollar trading volume on that day, |Riyd|/VOLDiyd. Riyd is the return on stock i on day d of year
y and VOLDiyd is the respective daily dollar volume. Amihud (2002) argued that his measure
captures Kyle’s concept of illiquidity – the response of price to order flow (see Kyle 1985). The
following formula captures the way in which we compute Amihud’s price impact measure:

∑

|

|
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where Diy is the number of days for which data are available for stock i in year y.
These three “liquidity” measures essentially capture stock illiquidity. Consistent with
prior studies (e.g. Fang et al. 2009; Edmans et al. 2012) we use the natural log of the inverse of
these three “illiquidity” measures as our measure of liquidity. Panel A of the following table
reports the descriptive statistics for the illiquidity and the liquidity measures based on the highlow, Gibbs sampler and Amihud approaches. To generate the following table, for the period of
1970-2010, we compute the illiquidity measures over a period of 252 trading days that ends in
the December of each year. After obtaining these illiquidity measures, we use the natural log of
the inverse of these illiquidity measures as our measure of liquidity. Panel B of the following
table reports the Pearson and Spearman correlations between these illiquidity and liquidity
measures.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variables
Mean Std. Dev.
HL
0.018
0.022
Gibbs
0.011
0.015
Amihud
8.278
68.895
LIQ_HL
4.426
0.852
LIQ_G
5.017
1.001
LIQ_A
1.736
3.228

Q1
0.006
0.003
0.018
3.858
4.314
-0.696

Median
0.011
0.006
0.190
4.512
5.108
1.663

Q3
0.021
0.013
2.005
5.068
5.761
4.033

Panel B: Pearson (Upper Triangle) and Spearman (Lower Triangle) Correlations
Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
HL (1)
0.93 0.53 -0.81 -0.74 -0.59
Gibbs (2)
0.89
0.53 -0.78 -0.81 -0.66
Amihud (3)
0.68 0.79
-0.27 -0.25 -0.24

LIQ_HL (4)

-1.00 -0.89 -0.68

0.91

LIQ_G (5)

-0.89 -1.00 -0.79

0.89

LIQ_A (6)

-0.68 -0.79 -1.00

0.68

0.69
0.79

0.79
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APPENDIX 3: ADDITIONAL CONTROL VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE CAUSALITY TEST
Variables
AT
AT2
D_NOA

OC

PRM
RRM
MS

ZS

Definitions
Justification
= the number of years that the auditor has audited The risk of not detecting errors as a result
the firm.
of unfamiliarity decreases with tenure.
= the square of AT.
Potential nonlinear relationship between
auditor tenure and audit quality
= an indicator variable that equals one if the net Managers’ capability of managing earnings
operating assets (i.e., shareholders’ equity less upward through accruals is constrained by
cash and marketable securities plus total debt) at accruals-based earnings management made
the beginning of fiscal year t divided by lagged in prior periods.
sales is greater than the median of the Net operating assets proxy for the extent of
corresponding industry-year, and zero if otherwise. accruals-based earnings management in
prior periods.
= days receivable plus days inventory minus days Firms with longer operating cycles have
payable at the beginning of fiscal year t.
larger accruals accounts and wait a longer
period for accruals to reverse. Therefore,
firms with longer operating cycles have
greater flexibility for accruals-based
earnings management.
= the predicted component of real activities-based Managers use real activities-based and
earnings management.
accruals-based earnings management as
= the unexpected component of real activities-based substitutes.
earnings management.
= the ratio of the firm’s sales to the total sales of its Accruals-based earnings management
industry at the beginning of fiscal year t, where increases with costs associated with real
industry is defined on the basis of 3-digit SIC activities-based earnings management.
codes.
 Firms with larger market shares and
= z-score at the beginning of fiscal year t, where ztheir managers may consider real
score
is
activities-based
earnings
management be relatively less
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.
MTB
IO

ROA

MB

CC

DO
DS

= the marginal tax rate, defined and provided by
Professor John Graham.
= the percentage of institutional ownership in the
calendar quarter that is closest to the end of fiscal
year t.

= the return on assets, computed using net income
for the rolling four quarters that ends in the third
quarter of fiscal year t.
= The ratio of market value of equity to the book
value of equity.

= an indicator variable that equals one if CEO is the
chairman of the board of directors, and zero if
otherwise.
= the average stock ownership of board of directors.
= the number of directors serving in the board of
directors.
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costly.
 Firms with poor financial health
and their managers may perceive
real
activities-based
earnings
management more costly given
concerns with survival and
potential long-term negative impact
of real activities-based earnings
management.
 The greater marginal tax rates, the
relatively higher the net present
value of tax costs associated with
real
activities-based
earnings
management.
 The higher the proportion of
institutional owners the greater the
scrutiny by institutional investors
and therefore the more difficult real
activities-based
earnings
management.
Earnings management is related to firm
performance. Return on assets (ROA)
measures firm performance.
Need to control for firms’ growth rate.
The ratio of market value of equity to book
value of equity proxies for firms’ growth
prospects.
Effective governance constrains earnings
management and improves financial
reporting transparency. As a result, firms
with better corporate governance have
greater stock liquidity because information
asymmetries across investors are lower as a

Badertscher
(2011)
Zang (2012)
Zang (2012)
Bebchuk et al.
(2009)
Bhagat and
Bolton (2008)
Chung et al.
(2010)

DI
AI
EI

HI

LCOV

LIT

SEO

MBE

D_RETj

= the percentage of independent directors in the result of better corporate governance.
board of directors.
Effectiveness of corporate governance is
= the percentage of independent directors in the shaped by
audit committee of the board of directors.
 Board
structure:
directors’
ownership, board size, CEO-chair
= the entrenchment index developed in Bebchuk,
duality, director independence,
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) that is based on six
independence of audit committee
provisions. Appendix 2 provides the details.
 Governance
provisions:
entrenchment index
= Herfindahl index, the sum of squares of the ratio The greater industry competition the more
of each firm’s sales to total sales in the same costly real activities-based earnings
industry defined by three-digit SIC codes in year t- management.
1.
= the natural log of one plus the number of analysts The greater the number of analysts
following the firm in the three months prior to the following a firm the greater the monitoring
earnings announcement.
by analysts and therefore more constraints
on accruals-based earnings management.
= an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is Firms competing in high litigation risk
in a high litigation risk industry including industries tend to engage less in accrualsbiotechnology, computers, electronics, and retail. based earnings management.
Appendix 3 provides the details.
= an indicator variable that equals one if the firm Firms tend to manage earnings when
ever sells stocks in the next three fiscal years and planning to have SEOs in the near future.
equals zero if otherwise.
= the percentage of times of meeting/beating Firms with consistent MBE performance in
analysts’ forecast consensus in the past eight the past have a stronger incentive to
quarters.
manage earnings.

= a dummy variable that indicates the membership
of a firm-year observation in five equal groups
generated according to the magnitude of
cumulative stock returns over past three years
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Firms with overvalued stocks tend to
Jensen (2005)
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Badertscher
Past cumulative stock performance
(2011)
reasonably captures the extent to which

LEV
IC

LCSHO

ADA_P1

where the group with lowest cumulative stock
returns serves as the benchmark, j=1,2,3,4.
= the ratio of total debt to total assets.
= the inverse of interest coverage ratio computed as
the interest expense in fiscal year t divided by
operating income before depreciation in fiscal year
t-1.
= the natural log of total outstanding shares.

firms’ stocks are overvalued.
Firms manage earnings to avoid debt
covenant violations.

It will be more difficult for firms to
manage earnings to achieve desired
earnings per share when the number of
shares outstanding is greater.
= the absolute value of discretionary accruals of Less earnings management leads to greater
fiscal year t-1.
transparency and
therefore
greater
liquidity.
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